Evaluation of aviation career pay incentives among the Naval Aviation enterprise utilizing auction mechanisms by Williams, Brett M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-03
Evaluation of aviation career pay incentives among
the Naval Aviation enterprise utilizing auction mechanisms
Williams, Brett M.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
EVALUATION OF AVIATION CAREER PAY 
INCENTIVES AMONG THE NAVAL AVIATION 








Thesis Advisor:  Noah Myung 
Second Reader: William R. Gates 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
EVALUATION OF AVIATION CAREER PAY INCENTIVES AMONG THE 
NAVAL AVIATION ENTERPRISE UTILIZING AUCTION MECHANISMS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Brett M. Williams 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER    
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number NPS.2014.0043-IR-EM2-A.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Naval Aviation utilizes the Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) as a means to retain qualified aviators to meet 
manpower requirements. However, the current program has failed to meet targeted retention across communities 
while overpaying nearly $5,300,000 during FY-2013, according to Eric Kelso. This thesis examines the potential 
improvements of applying uniform-price auction, Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD), and Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM) compensation programs to replace the current bonus system. 
Incorporating survey results from 2,316 naval officers across Navy Aviation, we analyzed the impact that market-
based mechanisms would have on quantity, quality, and cost for retained naval aviators. Using these responses, we 
developed individual quality scores and reservation prices to apply three auction mechanisms to the retention goals 
and costs of the FY-2013 ACCP program. 
Our research shows that a market-based auction could include improvements in cost, quality, and particularly quantity 
of aviators eligible for the Department Head Screen Board. The uniform-price auction meets all retention objectives 
across Navy Aviation, while reducing costs in some communities by $1,250,000. The QUAD auction improves the 
average quality of aviators retained under the uniform-price auction while CRAM demonstrates that non-monetary 





14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Aviation retention, Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP), auction, bonus,  
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
183 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
EVALUATION OF AVIATION CAREER PAY INCENTIVES AMONG THE 
NAVAL AVIATION ENTERPRISE UTILIZING AUCTION MECHANISMS 
 
 
Brett M. Williams 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.A., Duke University, 2003 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iii 




Naval Aviation utilizes the Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) as a means to 
retain qualified aviators to meet manpower requirements. However, the current program 
has failed to meet targeted retention across communities while overpaying nearly 
$5,300,000 during FY-2013, according to Eric Kelso. This thesis examines the potential 
improvements of applying uniform-price auction, Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD), 
and Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) compensation programs to 
replace the current bonus system. 
Incorporating survey results from 2,316 naval officers across Navy Aviation, we 
analyzed the impact that market-based mechanisms would have on quantity, quality, and 
cost for retained naval aviators. Using these responses, we developed individual quality 
scores and reservation prices to apply three auction mechanisms to the retention goals 
and costs of the FY-2013 ACCP program. 
Our research shows that a market-based auction could include improvements in 
cost, quality, and particularly quantity of aviators eligible for the Department Head 
Screen Board. The uniform-price auction meets all retention objectives across Navy 
Aviation, while reducing costs in some communities by $1,250,000. The QUAD auction 
improves the average quality of aviators retained under the uniform-price auction while 
CRAM demonstrates that non-monetary incentives provide aviators means to remain in 
service while lowering overall costs to the Navy. 
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Manpower requirements and compensation within the Navy continue to be 
reviewed and placed under greater scrutiny as mission requirements change under new 
strategic guidance and as personnel costs continue to represent larger portions of the 
Defense budget. Under the current administration, military compensation requires a 
review that provides flexible, efficient, and effective systems that are capable of 
maintaining a high-quality Defense Force at a fiscally sustainable cost (Principles for 
modernizing, 2013). Within the Navy personnel system, manpower decisions must reflect 
both the quantity and quality of the individuals required to meet mission capability. As 
mentioned in OPNAVINST 1000.16K,  
Efficient Use of Resources. Manpower requirements shall reflect the 
minimum quantity, calculated using the approved Navy standard work 
weeks …, and quality of manpower required for peacetime and wartime to 
effectively and efficiently accomplish the activity's mission (these two 
factors are commonly paired together as “quan/qual”). (Chief of Naval 
Operations) [CNO], 2011, p. 2-2) 
While the Navy has seen successful in recruiting highly qualified individuals, 
maintaining those persons in a revitalized economy requires efficient use of Special and 
Incentive pays (Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness, 2012). The Navy 
aviation community utilizes the Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) as an 
extension of the Aviation Career Incentive Pay to maintain a sufficient supply of Naval 
Aviators to support mission requirements.  
This ACCP program utilizes set price amounts in order to provide incentives for 
aviators to extend beyond their minimum service requirement. These set prices, however, 
lack the fidelity to ensure precise retention rates among both the total aviation community 
as well as individual communities. The result is over-retention in some communities and 
low take-rates in other communities (Kelso, 2014).  In FY 2013, the Naval Air Forces 
over spent $5,325,000 with a retention error of on average 36.7%. 
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A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
We utilize three market based compensations, a simple uniform- price auction, 
Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD) developed by Myung (2013) in which monetary 
discounts are applied to bidders who meet a specified quality threshold, and 
combinatorial retention auction mechanism (CRAM) Coughlan, Gates and Myung (2012) 
which offers non—monetary incentives are a portion of the compensation package.  
Survey questions were developed regarding reservation price, preference of non-
monetary incentives (NMIs), value of NMIs, demographic and career progression data, 
and personnel outlooks of factors that may influence willingness to remain in service. 
After the survey was developed, the survey was distributed among all active duty navy 
aviators and NFOs. Reservation prices, quality of the aviators, and values of NMI are 
applied to simulations of three auction models designed to meet retention goals, increase 
quality among aviators, or incorporate NMIs into compensation packages. The results are 
then examined and analyzed and compared to the current system.  
Utilizing the simple uniform-price auction, retention goals for each community 
were consistently met, which is a substantial improvement from the current system. We 
found that the aggregate costs resulted $34,770,000 or an increase of 20.8%, resulting in 
a cost of $105,045 per aviator with 0% retention error. A large part of increase in cost is 
due to the fact that we simply retained the right number of aviators in the communities 
where the current system under-retained. When capped to the congressional limits of 
$125,000, the total cost per aviator decreased to $102,209 while incurring an average of 
1.8% error in retention. Furthermore, when we modified the bid to be the smaller of the 
actual ACCP the aviator accepted in the past or the bid that was submitted in our 
questionnaire, we found that the total cost decreased to $30,560,000 or a total cost of 
$92,326 per aviator with 0% retention error. When comparing this cost to the current 
system, corrected for over retention, this cost represents 11.3% in cost savings.  
When we incorporated quality scores and discounts into the two QUAD models, 
we found that both met or increased quality scores among the individuals receiving the 
bonus with 0% retention error. For the first model, in which we applied a $25,000 
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discount to the top 10% of aviators in each category, total equivalent costs increased by 
$1,052,170 or 3.0%, while quality scores increased by 5.9% when compared to the 
simple uniform-price auction. The total cost per aviator resulted in $108,224 or an 
increase of 5.0% compared to the current system corrected for over retention. Utilizing 
the second model, in which a $25,000 discount was applied to the top 25% of each 
community, we found that we retained the correct number of aviators at a cost of 
$106,262 or an increase of $402,949 compared to the uniform-price cost. The increase of 
quality score by 0.82 points between the uniform-price and QUAD II model represents 
retaining the number one EP aviator in the squadron compared to the number 3 EP 
aviator in the squadron. 
When we incorporate geographic choice as an option when modeling a CRAM 
auction, we found that the aggregate costs decreased by $195,000 while meeting all 
retention objectives. Over 53% of the surveyed aviators assigned some value to 
geographic choice with an average value of $50,227. By incorporating another non-
monetary incentive of in-residence graduate education, the average cost decreased to $96, 
918, or nearly $6,000 less than the average cost per aviator when corrected for over 
retention. The average value for in-residence education was $46,215 while 63% of the 
aviators indicated an interest and submitted a value for the non-monetary incentive. Not 
only are these significant an improvement in cost and quantity, but CRAM does an 
excellent job in allocating these NMIs. As found in Coughlan, Gates, & Myung (2014), 
NMIs are difficult to distribute to the right individual without a market-based mechanism 
such as CRAM.  
In summary, we introduce three market-based mechanisms to improve the way 
current compensation system works in the US Naval Air Forces. These improvements are 
in some combination of cost, quantity, quality, and the distribution of NMIs, as seen in 
Table 1. Furthermore, it is worth noting that we are not restricted to using just one of 




Table 1.   Comparison of Current ACCP system to Uniform-Price Auction, 
QUAD Auction, and CRAM Auction   
B. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II provides background 
regarding the current career path for naval aviators and Naval Flight Officers, 
performance evaluation, promotion processes, history of the ACCP program, and issues 
regarding retention of aviators for the Aviation Department Head Selection Board. 
Chapter III describes the terminology, rules, and bidding strategies regarding general 
auction theory. Chapter IV illuminates the three type of auction models that the author 
proposed to simulate: simple Uniform-Price, Quality Adjusted Discount Auction, and 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism. Chapter V covers the methodology of both 
the survey and the simulated auctions and provides descriptive statistics of the results 
from the survey. Chapter VI provides results and analysis of the auction models from 
Chapter IV applied to naval aviators and NFOs that replied to the survey. Chapter VII 
contains conclusions and future policy and research recommendations. 
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C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Our research will aim to answer the following questions: 
1. Primary Research Questions 
• What alternative methods can be used for administering the Aviation 
Career Continuation Pay (ACCP)? 
• What, approximately, is the market clearing price for the Aviation Career 
Continuation Pay (ACCP) in order to retain the correct number and quality 
of officer among the various Type / Model / Series? 
• What are the appropriate metrics for deciding the quality of officers 
among naval aviation in order to maintain high quality for retention?  
• What efficiency gain and loss can we expect with a market-based 
compensation? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What factors influence preferences of staying in the Navy? 
 5 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter discusses the history and purpose of the Aviation Career 
Continuation Pay (ACCP). Section A discusses the career path of a typical aviator and 
the opportunities for individuals to be considered “the best and fully qualified” (Naval 
Personnel Command [NPC], 2014c). Performance evaluation and board selection 
processes are included in order to provide sufficient background on how career 
progression is monitored and allowed to continue. 
Section B discusses the Navy and, in particular, Naval Aviation as an internal 
labor market. In order for internal labor markets to maintain highly qualified individuals, 
long-term contracts must be offered. Internal labor markets, however, may be influenced 
by external forces; the Navy is no exception. 
Section C discusses the history of the ACCP program and how the current 
implementation allows for inexact take-rate and pay matching. Additional factors for 
consideration include costs incurred by offering bonuses to aviators above needed Navy 
requirements and the costs associated with retaining officers who do not meet the service 
obligations required by the contract for which they signed. 
A. NAVAL AVIATOR CAREER PROGRESSION AND EVALUATION 
Naval Aviators require unique and precise skills in order to operate the aircraft 
under their authority. In order to provide these learned skills, Naval Aviation has 
developed stringent training and a career path that attempts to efficiently utilize the 
required resources and maximize combat readiness. The typical career path for a Navy 
aviation officer includes five stages: flight training, first sea tour, first shore tour, second 
sea tour (or disassociated sea tour), and Department Head tour (see Appendix A for 
diagram depicting the typical aviation career stages and milestones). 
These stages incorporate evaluation methods in which officers are assessed and 
ranked against their peers. Top performers are offered eligibility for career milestone 
opportunities or community selection. Failure to complete these milestones often 
restrains continued advancement within the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE). 
 7 
1. Career Progression and Milestones 
a. Flight Training 
Unlike many other Navy communities, potential pilots and Naval Flight Officers 
proceed to initial training with formal classrooms, virtual learning environments, and live 
training prior to reporting to an operational squadron. Duration of training and the 
requisite knowledge depends on the community with which the aviator will eventually 
deploy. This training can be divided into two training periods: undergraduate flight 
training and Fleet Replacement Squadron category I training.  
(1) Undergraduate Flight Training 
Prior to designation as a naval pilot or flight officer, officers must undergo 
training under the cognizance of the Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA), who has 
authority over five training wings and 17 squadrons. This command, Naval Air Training 
Command (TRACOM), has the responsibility of instructing more than 1,500 prospective 
pilots and NFOs, labeled Student Naval Aviators (SNAs) and Student Naval Flight 
Officers (SNFOs), from the U.S. Navy, U.S Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, and 
numerous allied nations. It also ensures completion of CNATRA’s respective flight 
training curricula (CNATRA, n.d.b). 
In order to reduce costs and attrition later in the training syllabus, prospective 
aviators are required to conduct Introductory Flight Screening (IFS). Under the purview 
of CNATRA training, IFS attempts to remove potential naval aviators who lack required 
“determination, motivation, or aeronautical adaptability” while providing opportunities 
for officers who have never experienced aeronautical flight (CNATRA, 2012, p. 4). In 
order to fulfill the CNATRA instruction, student aviators must pass the FAA Private Pilot 
Airplane Airman Test with a minimum score of 80 within 50 days of enrollment. After 
completion of the test, aviators receive 15 hours of initial flight training with qualified 
instructors so that the aviator may qualify for and complete a solo flight. Failure to meet 
these objectives may result in dismissal from the Navy aviation training pipeline. Those 
individuals who already possess, at a minimum, a recreational pilot certificate are exempt 
from the IFS program and may begin the next stage immediately (CNATRA, 2012). 
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After completion of IFS, all prospective aviators receive orders to Naval Air 
Station (NAS) Pensacola to enroll in Aviation Preflight Indoctrination (API). API 
provides formal instruction to prospective aviators in fundamental aviation concepts such 
as aerodynamics, weather, navigation, engine operation, and “rules of the road” (Naval 
Aviation Schools Command, 2014). Like IFS, API is used as another means to determine 
officer competence and determination in order to reduce attrition during the actual 
training in the aircraft. Over the six-week course, officers are tested on the material they 
learned in class in addition to physical readiness testing, survival training, and aviation 
water survival training. Individuals unable to maintain minimum academic or physical 
training standards are considered for re-designation or administrative separation from the 
Navy (Naval Aviation Schools Command, 2014). 
SNAs and SNFOs are kept together during API. After completion of the syllabus, 
these two communities are segregated into two separate training pipelines. Both syllabi 
start with “primary” flight training in which aviators learn basic flight maneuvers, 
recovery procedures for emergencies, precision aerobatics, instrument navigation, visual 
navigation, and formation flight (Kelso, 2014). Since SNAs will be rated as pilots, their 
syllabus is twice as long as that of SNFOs (with a course time of 22 weeks versus 11 
weeks). SNFOs may learn the same initial skills as SNAs, but they are not required to fly 
solo in the training aircraft; instead, they focus on learning navigational skills in 
preparation for their follow-on tours. Throughout the syllabus, academic tests and flights 
are evaluated by instructor pilots; upon completing primary, these evaluations will be 
used to rank the graduating cohort (Kelso, 2014). Graduates are offered follow-on 
“pipelines” based on their rankings and available slots within that community. Quotas are 
established by determining projected requirements within the various aviation 
communities (Kelso, 2014). These pipelines may represent specific aviation communities 
while others represent another point where students continue to be evaluated for selection 
into another pipeline or aviation community (Kelso, 2014) (see Appendix B for diagram 
depicting SNA and SNFO flight training selection trees). 
Once the SNA or SNFO matches to a specific community, little opportunity exists 
to move to another community; the aviator or NFO will serve in that community for the 
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rest of his or her aviation career. Table 2 lists the communities and associated type, 
model, and series (T/M/S) aircraft available for selection by SNAs and SNFOs. SNFOs 
are only able to select communities that have slots available for NFOs (e.g., VAW, VP, 
and VFA) while SNAs may select any community. Depending on various factors, SNAs 
typically require 18 to 24 months in order to finish undergraduate flight training, while 
SNFOs typically complete their training pipeline 12 to 18 months after commissioning 
(Kelso, 2014). Upon successfully completion of this undergraduate flight training, both 
SNAs and SNFOs earn their “wings” and become officially designated as Naval Aviators 



















Table 2.   Active Duty Naval Aviation Communities Eligible for Aviation 
Career Continuation Pay (from Kelso, 2014) 
(2) Fleet Replacement Squadron 
While officers are considered “winged” after their undergraduate flight training, 
they require additional training prior to reporting to their first sea tour. Undergraduate 
training is completed on training aircrafts, no matter which community that SNA or 
Community Formal Name T/M/S Aircraft 
HM Helicopter Mine Countermeasures MH-53E 
HS/HSC Helicopter Anti-Submarine/       
Helicopter Sea Combat 
SH-60F/HH-
60H/ MH-60S 
HSL/HSM Helicopter Anti-Submarine Light/ 
Helicopter Maritime Strike 
SH-60B/           
MH-60R 
VAQ Electronic Attack EA-6B/EA-18G 
VAW Carrier Airborne Early Warning E-2C,D 
VFA Strike Fighter FA-18C,E,F 
VP Patrol P-3C/P-8A 
VRC Fleet Logistics Support C-2 
VQ(P) Fleet Air Reconnaissance EP-3E 
VQ(T) Fleet Air Reconnaissance E-6B 
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SNFO will eventually join. Aviators must proceed to community-specific fleet 
replacement squadrons (FRSs) in order to learn how to employ the T/M/S in which they 
will fly during the rest of their careers. Exceptions to this progression are the SNFOs in 
the VAW, VP, VQ (P), and VQ (T) communities, who begin FRS training prior to being 
“winged” (Kelso, 2014).  Portions of their FRS syllabi are still considered undergraduate 
training and therefore fall under the purview of CNATRA. The amount of time required 
to proceed through the FRS depends on available resources, community requirements, 
and, often times, the fiscal month in which the training begins. Completion may range 
from six months to over a year (Kelso, 2014). 
b. Initial Active Duty Service Obligation 
Under Title 10 U.S.C. § 653 (2015), pilots and NFOs incur a minimum service 
requirement associated with completion of flight training. This initial active duty service 
obligation begins as soon as the officer receives their wings of gold. Under Title 10 code, 
“minimum service requirement for all pilots trained to fly fixed-wing jet aircraft shall be 
eight years…the minimum service requirement for all other pilots and NFOs shall be six 
years” (Minimum Service Requirement, 2015, para.[a,b]). While the eight-year obligation 
minimums were solely requirements for fixed-wing jet pilots, the Navy has increased 
duty service obligations for all pilots to eight years (Kelso, 2014).   
Due to differences in timing between pilot and NFO training, NFOs typically 
complete their MSR at the end of the first shore tour. This is the first opportunity for 
NFOs to separate from the Navy without penalty. Due to the additional two-year 
obligation, pilots typically are obligated to complete a second sea tour prior to separation 
from the Navy. 
c. First Sea Tour 
After completion of the FRS syllabus, naval aviators report to operational fleet 
squadrons that are deployable. Depending on various factors during the training pipeline, 
aviators should expect to arrive at their first sea tours roughly 18 to 36 months after the 
start of flight training. New aviators are often assigned squadron ground jobs 
commensurate with their limited experience. The emphasis of the tour is accumulation of 
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flight experience and attainment of tactical qualifications required in order to complete 
the mission statement found in the community’s Required Operational 
Capabilities/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) (NPC, n.d.b). As the officer 
becomes more experienced and progresses through his or her tour, division officer 
(DIVO) jobs are assigned with increasingly significant importance. Initial ground jobs 
may include public affairs officer or ground safety officer with little supervision over 
sailors; future assignments may include responsibility as a maintenance division officer ( 
responsible for dozens of junior to mid-career sailors). Evaluation of the first sea tour is 
based on both the tactical and safe conduct in the aircraft as well as effective 
management of primary and collateral duties and leadership over assigned enlisted 
personnel under their supervision.  
d. First Shore Tour 
After completing the first sea tour, aviators work with the community detailer, a 
representative at Naval Personnel Command who provides 33-month orders to a first 
shore tour. Different from the first sea tour, aviators have more latitude in the decisions 
available for their own career progression. While these options exist, the “Naval Aviation 
Community, however, prioritizes production billets. These billets are defined as any 
flight job which contributes to the support and manning of the Naval Aviation 
community. Priority is given to filling these billets first” (Chief of Naval Personnel 
[CNP], 2013b, para. 4). While the current Aviation Officer Community standards 
indicate that NAE values “outstanding  performance in an array of first shore tour 
billets…diversity of first tour assignments…is vital to aviation community future 
success” (NPC, n.d.b.), production tours were looked upon favorably in the last Aviation 
Department Head selection board (CNP, 2014).  
Since these production billets are limited in number and highly sought after, 
candidates requesting such assignments are screened to ensure that the best-qualified 
officers are selected and placed. Production billets include but are not limited to 
instructor duty at an FRS or TRACOM squadron, duty at a Test and Evaluation squadron, 
and Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) positions. These positions offer the aviator the 
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opportunity to (1) contribute to the entire Naval Aviation community, (2) further the 
officer’s own skills and talents, and (3) compete against a significantly large peer group 
(NPC, n.d.b). 
Other career options include non-production flying positions, such as Personnel 
Exchange Program (PEP) tours. Non-flying billets include the opportunity to pursue 
advanced degrees at institutions such as Naval Postgraduate School or Johns Hopkins. 
Staff positions among bases, carrier strike groups, or community wings are available for 
fill. Other aviators may elect to teach at the U.S. Naval Academy or NROTC units (NPC, 
n.d.b). Because these positions do not fit the stringent requirement(s) of the production 
billets, they may “have adverse long-term career implications in future selection boards” 
(CNP, 2013b, para. 6) despite support from NAE for diversity during the first shore tour. 
e. Second Sea Tour or Disassociated Sea Tour 
Time permitting, aviators are often assigned 24-month orders to a second sea tour, 
or as commonly known, a “disassociated sea tour.” Aviators are offered diverse 
assignments, dependent on previous performance. Qualifications outside of the standard 
aviation career, such as Tactical Action Officer (TAO), Officer of the Deck (OOD), or 
Command Duty Officer (CDO) and experiences obtained within the larger Navy allow 
officers to gain a more diverse career perspective and tactical acumen. Some tours require 
prerequisite qualifications, preventing even stellar performers from being eligible for a 
variety of choice assignments (NPC, 2013c). 
Favorable consideration is given to those positions that enable aviators to add 
diverse professional development, compete in large summary groups for evaluation, and 
contribute to the entire Naval Aviation Enterprise. These positions may include flying 
billets on a Carrier Air Wing staff or as a squadron Training Officer or Tactics Officer. 
Favorable but non-flying assignments include other staff assignments (e.g., Destroyer 
Squadron [DESRON], Carrier Strike Group [CSG]), or aviation-related jobs attached to 
aircraft carriers or large deck amphibious ships. Additional opportunities include “Super 
JO” tours in which individuals return to their community to fly in operational squadrons 
or flying with foreign militaries on PEP tours (Kelso, 2014). 
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f. Department Head Tour 
Selection for operational Department Head (DH) includes 30-month assignment 
to a fleet squadron after completion of the current assignment, which is typically the 
second sea tour. If refresher training is required, officers are sent to the community’s FRS 
to complete a modified syllabus in order to complete safety and tactical requirements 
necessary at their squadron. 
Department Heads are expected to arrive at the squadron with the necessary 
tactical qualifications and the necessary maturity to operate the aircraft within established 
safety parameters. In contrast to the first sea tour, DH tours emphasize the competence 
and leadership of assigned primary and secondary collateral duties with minimal 
emphasis on tactical accomplishment in the aircraft. The primary assignments in which 
individual DHs are evaluated most intensely are Squadron Maintenance Officer and/or 
Squadron Operations Officer. Success in either or both of these positions denotes vital 
achievement of the necessary skills to operate the squadron in both the short term and 
over the long term. The primary discriminator for future command and advancement 
boards lies in the duration and noted success of the completion of either of these tours 
(NPC, 2013b). 
2. Performance Evaluation and Advancement 
Like any large organization, periodic evaluations are required in order to 
determine the success of individuals within the large group. The Navy utilizes the Navy 
Fitness Report (FITREP) as the means by which documentation of an aviator’s 
performance can be captured and necessary rewards and punishments are determined for 
the future career of the individual officer. Reporting seniors, typically the Commanding 
Officer or the Officer in Charge of the unit for which the officer is assigned, provides 
numeric scores, narrative comments, and ranking among peers within each “summary 
group.” This officer ranking is conducted numerically and provides input into the 
Commanding Officer’s promotion recommendation category. These categories include 
Early Promote (EP), Must Promote (MP), Promotable (P), Progressing, and Significant 
Problems. Only 60% of Lieutenant (O-3) summary groups may receive a 
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recommendation of EP or MP with a further restriction that only the top 20% of the 
summary group may receive an EP recommendation (CNP, 2011). Similarly, 50% of 
Lieutenant Commander (O-4) summary groups are eligible for EP or MP but only 20% of 
that summary group may receive a higher EP recommendation (CNP, 2011). Typically, 
the remaining officers receive a recommendation of P, as long as there are no major 
deficiencies. These restrictions were put into place in order to discourage grade and 
recommendation inflation where large percentages of officers receive MP or EP 
recommendations and offer little striation in evaluation (CNP, 2011). 
The final FITREP an aviator receives during his or her tour is referred to as a 
“high-water” FITREP or the “competitive” FITREP. As this is the last opportunity to 
compete against a large group of officers within or near an officer’s Year Group (YG), 
results of this FITREP provide more weight and summarize the efforts and performance 
of that officer throughout one’s tour. This “high-water” FITREP remains instrumental in 
the opportunities afforded the aviator. Failure to receive high marks and a highly coveted 
EP ranking limits the highly competitive billets available for follow-on shore and second 
sea tours (Kelso, 2014). 
a. Statutory Boards 
Officers across all services are typically selected for promotion to the rank of O-2 
and O-3 as long as they are part of the All Fully Qualified List (AFQL). If officers will 
have completed a legislative mandated 24 months in their current pay grade within the 
next fiscal year and as long they have received an FITREP of at least Promotable during 
their time in rank, they will be screened and will be recommended for promotion to the 
next rank. Those recommended for promotion will automatically advance to their next 
pay grade unless there is legitimate objection from their current Commanding Officer 
(NPC, n.d.b). 
Unlike these automatic promotions, statutory promotion boards are required for 
promotion to the ranks above Lieutenant (O-3), beginning with the promotion to 
Lieutenant Commander (O-4). These boards convene annually at the discretion of the 
Secretary of the Navy and consider officers with an approved promotion zone for that 
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year. While this zone may fluctuate from year to year, the Lieutenant Commander zone 
typically aligns with the eighth year of commissioned service for an officer (Kelso, 
2014). Officers that fail to select to the next pay grade will be included in the board 
process the following year and in accordance with Title 10 U.S.C. § 632, those who fail 
twice to select for Lieutenant Commander are subject to involuntary separation from 
Active Duty naval service unless they are recommended for continuation since they may 
be within six years of being eligible for retirement (Secretary of the Navy, 2006). 
Aviators do not compete solely against other aviators during a statutory board but 
instead compete against other Unrestricted Line (URL) communities (i.e., Surface 
Warfare, Submarine Warfare, Naval Special Warfare) for an aggregate promotion 
recommendation pool. The rate at which all eligible officers may be selected for 
promotion is determined by the Secretary of the Navy and provided as guidance through 
the Active Duty Naval Promotion Plan. For the most recent boards, selection for 
promotion has been limited to 70% for both O-4 and O-5 boards (Secretary of the Navy, 
2013; Secretary of the Navy, 2014). While these percentages are set for entire URL 
community, each community may select at varied percentage rates. As seen in Figure 1, 
pilots and NFOs selected at 61% and 63%, respectively, for In-Zone officers during the 
FY-14 Lieutenant Commander Selection Board. During the most recent O-4 board (FY-
15), selection rates dipped to 56% for pilots and 49% for NFOs (Osborn, 2015). 
 16 
 
Figure 1.  FY-14 O-4 Selection (from NPC, 2013a [figure askew in source]) 
The Active Duty Naval Promotion Plan provides not only guidance regarding 
selection rates but guidance to the board when determining what officers should be 
recommended for promotion to ensure the Navy receives the “best and fully qualified” 
officers. The key concept and measure by which the board should determine fitness for 
promotion is “proven and sustained performance in command or other leadership 
positions in difficult and challenging assignments” (Secretary of the Navy, 2014, para. 4). 
Since these boards may be comprised of various URL communities, NPC provides 
additional guidance on desired career paths and values for each community (see 
Appendix A for NPC guidance on typical aviator career progression and Aviation 
Community values). 
Boards consider not only operational qualifications and skill sets but other 
expertise and credentials earned during an officer’s career path. These may include 
Financial Resource Management, Operational Analysis, Joint Experience, Acquisition 
Corps, Education and Training, and others (Secretary of the Navy, 2014, para.4). 
Consideration should be given to officers who participated in Individual Augmentee (IA), 
Global Support Assignment (GSA), Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Irregular 
 17 
Warfare, or Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands (APH) program assignments as well as to the 
attainment of graduate education, experience in specialized areas, and even Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME) (Secretary of the Navy, 2014). 
b. Administrative Selection Boards 
Unlike statutory boards, administrative selection boards, known as screen boards, 
are community-specific, do not include all URL or RL officers, and are convened so that 
officers may be selected for positions that fulfill specific career milestones. These include 
Department Head, Aviation Command, and Aviation Major Command for officers 
designated as 1310 (Naval pilot) and 1320 (Naval Flight Officer). 
While the statutory and administrative boards have different purposes and are 
conducted by dissimilar processes, officers’ participation in administrative boards may 
require selection from a previous statutory board. Officers may only be considered for the 
Aviation DH Screen Board (ADHSB) one year after being selected for promotion to O-4 
and are considered as In-Zone (IZ). These individuals are receiving their “first” look at 
DH and so if they do not select for DH, they will receive a “second” look the following 
year and categorized as Above-Zone (AZ). Failure for an individual to select to 
Operational DH after their AZ board places them into a pool to be considered for 
Operational-Training DH. If selected, the officer may continue to serve in an aviation 
career path while ensuring the NAE continues to receive dividends on their initial 
investment (NPC, 2013c). 
NPC provides guidance for selecting aviators that is included in the 
Administrative Screen Board Precept. Similar to the guidance provided from SECNAV 
regarding statutory boards, the ADHSB is told that “Naval Aviation is first and foremost 
an aerial combat force, and values the attainment of warfare qualification and leadership 
both in the air and on the ground The Naval Aviation Enterprise continues to value the 
war fighting ability and tactical excellence required for Operational Commanders to excel 
in combat” (NPC, 2014c, para. 4). Therefore, additional qualifications outside of the 
normal career path are not given favorable consideration but those qualifications attained 
during the typical career path are given favorable consideration. 
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Table 3 shows the selection rates for the FY-2014 ADHSB. Aviators receiving an 
EP out of their first sea tour are promoted at the selection rate while those receiving a MP 
are selected at a rate 9 percentage points below their peers. One thing of note is that 407 
out of 416 (or 97.8%) eligible aviators received an EP out of their first sea tour (NPC, 
2014b) This indicates that either 1) grade inflation continues to occur despite efforts by 
CNP to limit EP distribution or 2) individuals who receive a MP during their first sea tour 
self-select out of the Navy or Naval Aviation and do not make themselves eligible for the 
ADHSB. 
Additionally, Not Observed FITREPs or FITREPs that do not have summary 
groups were looked upon unfavorably since those officers were not competing against 
other peers (NPC, 2014b). Examples of these tours include IA/GSA and graduate 
education programs. Selection rates for some production tours, including Test Pilot 
School and Operational Evaluation Squadrons, were not provided. 
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Table 3.   FY-2014 ADHSB Selection Rates (after NPC, 2014b) 
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B. NAVAL AVIATION AS AN INTERNAL LABOR MARKET 
Internal labor markets may be defined by the hiring and promotion process for the 
organization. When workers are hired into entry level jobs and higher levels are filled 
from within, an internal labor market exists. Wages are likely to be determined internally 
and may be less responsive to market pressures (Lazaear & Oyer, 2004). Naval aviation 
represents a potential labor market in which individuals are hired into entry-level jobs 
through commissioning programs that include the U.S. Naval Academy or Reserve 
Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), and they receive firm-specific human capital when 
they attend both IFS and API. This firm-specific human capital continues during both the 
undergraduate and FRS training syllabi. Once the officer receives this training and human 
capital, his value within his organization deviates from other firms, generating an ex post 
bilateral monopoly (i.e., a market where there is both a monopoly and a monopsony) 
(Lazaear & Oyer, 2004).  
The firm, in this case the Navy, must offer competitive long-term contracts in 
order to maintain the skills and learned human capital that matches the present value of 
the worker’s value to the firm. Within an internal labor market, when higher-level jobs 
require more firm-specific knowledge than lower level ones, the only means by which an 
individual can achieve this knowledge is by spending more time in the firm (Lazaear & 
Oyer, 2004). This is demonstrated in the O-4 and ADHSB precepts that value operational 
skills learned over the course of the officer’s career.  
Another reason for the long-term contracts of internal labor markets includes 
incentives. Deferred earnings provide incentives to put forth effort over the length of a 
career. Retirement and pension packages, healthcare coverage, and post-career Veterans 
Administration benefits are examples of efforts that the Department of Defense has 
offered as deferred incentives to promote long term careers.  
Worker-firm matching provides another framework by which worker wages may 
deviate from market wage offers. Productivity of any worker-firm match is idiosyncratic 
(Lazaear & Oyer, 2004) meaning that if a match is sufficiently good, the worker is worth 
more to the current firm than to other firms and a bilateral monopoly exists as the result 
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of rents (the difference between the actual payment made for production to its owner and 
the payment level expected by the owner). In other words, if naval officers who match 
exactly the values of the Navy as a whole are selected, wages do not need to match 
market wages in order for both the Navy and the officers to achieve expected utility 
levels.  
While the Navy may represent a representative internal labor market, external 
labor market wage setting may have an impact on any internal labor market and 
therefore, internal wages may fluctuate based on market mechanisms (Lazaear, & Oyer, 
2004). Additionally, airline industry hiring and external management positions provide 
exit points for naval aviators that help influence internal labor markets (Aviation Officer 
Community Manager, personal communication, 2014). 
C. CURRENT AVIATION CAREER CONTINUATION PAY 
In order to retain the critical skills learned by individuals in an organization, 
incentive pay provided by the organization attempts to match the desire of the targeted 
individual with compensation that entices them to remain as an employee. Retention 
bonuses paid for aviators represent a recent compensation package, beginning in the early 
1980s. After significant shortfalls in aviation manpower retention, monetary bonuses 
were paid to aviators that served beyond their Minimum Service Requirement (MSR). 
Since then, changes to amounts, targeted communities, and qualification have modified 
the Aviation Career Continuation Pay from its early inception to today’s current iteration 
(Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness [USD P&R], 2011). For a 
greater in-depth discussion of the history of the Aviation Officer Continuation 
Pay/Aviation Continuation Pay, refer to Kelso (2014).  
1. Current Aviation Career Continuation Pay (FY-2000 to Present) 
The current Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) program was designed in 
1999 as a method of addressing the need to retain experienced aviators in order to support 
the Navy’s operational missions and maintain combat readiness (CNO, 1999). Previous 
versions of the program acted as a de facto DH screen process so the new program was 
developed to provide incentives to return to sea and retain high-performing officers and 
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convince “high quality aviation officers to consider naval aviation as their primary career 
choice” (CNO, 1999, para. b). New changes from previous years would include: the 
opportunity to execute multiple retention contracts throughout an officer’s career, 
reinstate eligibility for all officers not selected for flag rank, and increase upper service 
eligibility limits from 14 years of service to 25 years (CNO, 1999). 
These changes allowed the FY-2000 ACCP program to offer short-term (two- or 
three-year) contracts, paying $15,000 for each year of additional service to aviators 
whose career path followed the Naval Aviation Community’s values. A mid-year revision 
offered long-term (five-year) contracts to first-time eligible pilots and NFOs, paying 
$25,000 and $15,000 respectively, per year. Individuals who agreed to these contracts 
were able to receive a 50% lump sum payment as soon as they accepted the conditions of 
the contract. Additionally, the short-term contracts were offered to officers who had 
obtained the rank of O-6 who had served in designated command billets and completed 
fewer 24 years of aviation service (Kelso, 2014). 
The next major adjustment to the ACCP included modifications made in the 
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002 (2001) which authorized early 
eligibility to aviators who had not yet completed their Minimum Service Requirement. 
Aviators who were within one year of their MSR would receive the ACCP in order to 
provide financial incentives to remain prior to the first critical stay-leave decision in the 
aviator’s career (Kelso, 2014). 
Lump payments were withheld in the FY-2004 ACCP program until the aviator 
successfully screened for Department Head. Short-term contract options were excluded in 
the FY-2005 program, forcing aviators to consider a long-term contract of five years. The 
end result of this removal of short contracts was obligated service for the aviator who 
extended to the aviation DH screen board. For the first time, the Navy instituted the 
formal policy of stopping annual payments for those officers who twice failed to screen 
during the aviation DH screen board (CNO, 2004). 
This FY-2005 format would continue until FY-2009, with a few annual changes. 
Instead of different tiers of payment between pilots and NFOs, the annual payment rate 
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increased to $25,000 for all aviators qualified to receive the bonus. Short-term contracts 
were re-introduced and categorized into three areas: sea duty, command, and aviation-
designated astronauts. These short-term contracts would pay $15,000 per annum and in 
FY-2008 only, short-term contracts were offered to Aviation Engineering Duty Officers 
(AEDOs) who screened for command (Kelso, 2014). 
Changes to the Navy Force structure resulted in ACCP distribution geared to meet 
retention goals. In FY-2010, NFO long-term contracts were reduced from $25,000 per 
year to only $15,000, while short-term contracts for sea duty were reduced to $10,000 
and for command to $12,000. Captains (O-6) and Commanders (O-5) selected for 
promotion to O-6 were no longer considered eligible for ACCP contracts (CNO, 2010). 
Further changes emerged in the FY-2011 ACCP program. To prevent run-away 
costs making the ACCP program untenable, contracts were designed to offer bonus 
amounts that were based on projected retention rates for individual communities instead 
of the overall aviation community. Generating nine pilot and six NFO categories, most 
categories saw bonus amounts reduced to encourage cost savings. Additionally, the lump 
sum payment was dissolved to promote deferred payments across the various fiscal year 
budgets. In FY-2012, short-term sea duty and command contracts were no longer offered. 
Individual categories would increase or decrease bonus amounts to match retention goals 
for that community for FY-2012 and FY-2013 (Kelso, 2014; CNO, 2013). 
The FY-2014 ACCP broke out the bonus into two categories, the Aviation 
Department Head Retention Bonus (ADHRB) and the Aviation Command Retention 
Bonus (ACRB). Similar to the previous FY-2013 program, the ADHRB offered various 
amounts of payment for long-term contracts for officers who were within one year of the 
MSR. One major change to the ADHRB, however, allows “early-takers” to sign a new 
contract if the amount for the FY-2015 ACCP program increases for that category. They 
would not be required to sign a new contract if the amount decreased in the subsequent 
year after signing (NPC, 2014d). The ACRB established an $18,000 per annum bonus for 
remaining in service after completing a successful command tour (NPC, 2015). 
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2.  Current Retention Bonus Implementation 
a. Enactment 
(1) Congressional Legislation 
ACCP falls under Title 37 U.S.C. § 301b (2014) due to its nature as a career 
incentive pay. The Secretary of the Navy is thereby authorized to pay an additional bonus 
to any aviation officer who has met certain requirements and agrees to additional active 
duty service of at least one year after signing a written contract verifying the obligation to 
complete the service. While the officer must execute the written agreement prior to 
December 31, 2014, the officer covered under this agreement: 
• Is entitled to receive aviation career incentive pay (ACIP) 
• Is in a pay grade below flag officer (O-7 or above) 
• Is qualified to perform operational flying duty; and 
• Has completed any active duty service commitment incurred for undergraduate 
aviator training or is within one year of completing such commitment (Special Pay, 
2014) For Navy pilots, this means that they have completed eight years of service 
after receiving their wings. Conversely, NFOs must complete six years of service. 
While there is no stated maximum total amount, aviation officers may only 
receive $25,000 per year of service and this must be prorated so that the contract does not 
extend beyond the 25th year of aviation service. The Secretary of the Navy has the 
authority to have payments allocated as a lump sum or installments. If the officer fails to 
complete the service requirement, the U.S. code provides authority to recoup funds from 
the officer. 
(2) U.S. Navy Policy 
Current Navy policy of the Aviation Career Continuation Pay falls under the 
purview of OPNAV Instruction 7220.9 (CNO, 2005a). Under this instruction, 
Commander Naval Personnel Command, Aviation Officer Assignments (PERS-43) is 
delegated the authority to evaluate eligibility, accept written ACCP agreements by Naval 
Aviators to remain on active duty in a billet designated by PERS-43, and administer the 
ACCP program (CNO, 2005a). Additional qualifications to be eligible for ACCP include: 
• Recommendation for receipt of ACCP by the officer’s command officer 
• Service in a billet designated by PERS-43 
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• No scheduled mandatory separation from active duty in less than one year from the 
date the ACCP would be paid 
• No two-time failure for selection for promotion to the next higher grade unless 
selected for continuation on active duty 
• Completion of service obligation incurred during pilot training when transitioned 
from NFO to pilot (CNO, 2005a) 
b. Implementation 
The focus of current ACCP programs has been the retention of active duty Naval 
Aviators who have completed their MSR and are reaching stay-or-leave decisions. This is 
typically between seven and 12 years of service for the first bonus (ADHRB) and after 
completion of command tours (ACRB). Long-term contracts (five years), payable in 
equal annual installments, are offered to junior officers to provide incentives to remain 
eligible for the next career milestone of Department Head by extending their obligated 
service so that they remain until the first administrative screen board (Kelso, 2014). 
c. Announcement and Eligibility Periods 
Each year, details of the ACCP program are released through a Navy-specific 
Administrative Message (NAVADMIN). Included in the NAVADMIN are details about 
eligibility requirements, important changes from the previous year (e.g., bonus amounts, 
eligible communities, contract lengths), and the current types of contracts available. 
Dates in which the ACCP requests will be accepted are announced (typically upon 
release of the NAVADMIN until late in the fiscal year). For example, the FY-2014 
ADHRB was announced on 07 April 2014 and applications were accepted until 31 
August 2014 (CNO, 2014). 
During this submission period, aviators have two opportunities to choose ACCP 
and agree to a contract for additional obligated service. The first, termed early eligibility, 
occurs during the fiscal year prior to the expiration of an aviator’s MSR and obligates the 
aviator to additional service of five years once the request is accepted. The aviator will 
receive the current ACCP bonus over six equal, annual installments. First payment occurs 
one year prior to the expiration of the aviator’s initial obligated service with additional 
payments paid on the subsequent anniversary of this date (CNO, 2014). For example, if a 
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pilot was winged in July 2006, his or her MSR would expire in July 2014; if the pilot 
agrees to accept the early eligibility contract on April 2013, he or she would receive the 
first ACCP bonus in July 2013 and receive subsequent payments in July for five more 
years until the last payment on July 2018. 
The second period, or the initial eligibility period, occurs during the fiscal year in 
which the aviator’s MSR expires. Aviators who submit ACCP requests during this period 
also accept obligated additional service under the contract submitted to PERS-43. 
Bonuses are paid at the amount offered for that year’s current ACCP program and are 
paid over five, equal annual payments. The first payment is made upon expiration of the 
MSR or the acceptance of the contract, whichever is later. Subsequent payments are 
received on the anniversary of the initial payment (CNO, 2013). 
Most aviators who submit ADHRB contracts apply during their first eligibility 
window. Approximately 63 - 91% of all officers retained under the ACCP program 
signed up during early eligibility (Kelso, 2014), indicating that early eligibility provides a 
better incentive since their additional obligated service begins concurrent with their initial 
MSR. PERS-43 noted, however, that changes to the structure of the bonus paid to the 
individual communities have led to larger deferment to the initial eligibility period, which 
has created secondary consequences. Increases in annual bonus amounts are offered to 
officers to encourage acceptance during the early window. Yet in order to minimize 
excess retention the bonus decreases as soon as requirements are met. This cyclic 
fluctuation of bonus monies leads to officer behavioral unpredictability and generates 
difficulty for both the individual officer and PERS-43 in determining career path 
decisions (Kelso, 2014). 
d. Retention Goals and Performance 
While the ACCP contracts do not guarantee selection of Department Head or the 
retention of that officer within the Naval service, retention goals for ACCP are set against 
annualized fleet aviation DH requirements for both operational squadrons and operational 
training squadrons (e.g., TRACOM, FRS). Projected requirements through FY-2018 
include approximately 330 aviation DHs per year throughout the Naval Aviation 
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Enterprise. To meet these demands, the Navy uses the ACCP contracts as a means to 
retain 50% of the DH-eligible population. Assuming an annual rate of 9% for attrition or 
twice-failed to select for DH, PERS-43 established annual take-rate goals of between 350 
and 360 eligible aviators for FY-2014 through FY-2018 (Kelso, 2014). 
While take-rates for the entire Naval Aviation community appear to improve and 
meet desired goals, Table 4 demonstrates that take-rates vary vastly by community. 
Excessive retention in some communities (e.g., VAW NFO, HSL/HSM Pilot) makes up 
for other communities that are unable to make individual community take-rate goals (e.g., 
VAQ Pilot, VQ [P] NFO). Since career paths are typically set once selection is complete 
during undergraduate training, failure to obtain targeted community requirements via the 
ACCP may be understated by the aggregate take-rate of all aviation communities (Kelso, 
2014). 
 
Table 4.   Percent Attained of Annualized “Take-Rate” Goals (FY-2011 
through FY-2013) (from Kelso, 2014) 
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Failure to meet targeted retention goals, whether by over-retaining or under-
retaining aviators, led to inefficiencies in the Naval Aviation Enterprise. In FY-2011, 
specific communities retained a surplus of 19 aviators compared to targeted goals, 
leading to excessive costs of $950,000 for the Navy. In the same year, other communities 
failed to meet expected retention targets by a combined 76 aviators. Overall, the targeted 
retention (retained aviators who were capable of meeting specific community 
requirements) met a shortfall of 24% of the Navy’s goal. For FY-2012, these numbers 
improved, despite an additional cost of $850,000 with an excess of 12 aviators and an 
overall targeted retention rate of 87%. In contrast to this improvement, FY-2013 reversed 
this trend with retention of 71 excess aviators with an overpayment of $5,325,000. Other 
communities fell short of their retention goals by 51 aviators, leading to a targeted 
retention rate of 85%. Table 5 reiterates these issues (see Appendix C for detailed reports 
of recent ACCP performance). While these inefficiencies directly affect financial costs, 
under-retention in communities leads to insufficient pools of eligible officers and creates 
gaps in billets that are covered by extension of tour lengths for those already slated in DH 




Table 5.   Summary of ACCP Performance (FY2011 through FY 2013) (from Kelso, 2014) 
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e. Bonus Calculation and Amounts 
Language within the ACCP release provides no guidance for limiting the number 
of available annual ACCP contracts and very little guidance to the commanding officers 
that offer recommendations for suitability (CNO, 2014). Instead of utilizing specific 
targeted retention numbers as an internal reference for the number of contracts offered, 
the amount offered is adjusted by utilizing modeling techniques to determine whether 
expected changes will improve correlation between take-rates and community 
continuation rates. This modeling formula includes “recent ACCP ‘take-rates,’ 
community continuation rates, eligible aviator population size, and expected economic 
climate” (Kelso, 2014, p. 31). Each aviation community is categorized into one of four 
criteria: 
• Criterion A (reduce bonus to minimize excess retention): Sufficient numbers of 
aviators currently in the “initial” eligibility period belong to a community and Year 
Group (YG) that has attained or is close to attaining DH retention goals and their 
inclusion is not required for later year goals. 
• Criterion B (maintain or reduce bonus to balance requirements and minimize excess 
retention): Sufficient numbers of aviators currently in the “initial” eligibility period 
belong to a community and YG in order to meet DH retention goals; however, there is 
still a sufficient portion of aviators in the same YG who are either “early” eligible or 
not yet eligible to accept ACCP contracts. 
• Criterion C (increase bonus amount): Sufficient numbers of aviators from the 
“initial” eligible category are required to meet DH goals. 
• Criterion D (maintain or increase bonus to balance requirements and minimize 
excess retention): Low “early” eligible take-rates for a community and YG point to 
decreasing or sustained retention (Kelso, 2014) 
In addition to selecting a community’s category and projecting DH retention 
requirements, ACCP amounts are then adjusted utilizing the findings from a Center for 
Naval Analysis (CNA) report from 2006. According to Hansen and Moskowitz (2006), 
“$1,000-per-year increase in ACCP was associated with a 0.6% increase in retention 




Table 6.   ACCP Effects on Pilot Retention (from Hansen & Moskowitz, 2006) 
Additional factors to take-rates include aviation industry hiring practices. 
According to a Department of Defense Information Paper (Aviation Officer Community 
Manager [BUPERS-313, 2014]), increases in new hires across the aviation industry 
decrease the Cumulative Continuation Rate (CCR) of U.S. Navy pilots. The CCR 
provides the probability a pilot with seven years of commissioned service will continue in 
the Navy until twelve years of service. This timeframe represents the first stay-or-go 
choice for most aviators when they complete their MSR. Figure 2 shows the trends 




Figure 2.  Pilot Cumulative Continuation Rate with Trend Lines (from 
Aviation Officer Community Manager, personal communication, 2014) 
Table 7 expounds on changes made to bonus amounts across a five-year window. 
After FY-2010, bonuses were adjusted by community and designator instead of bonus 
amounts for different designators. Decreases in bonus amounts across almost all 
communities in FY-2011 have steadied, with most communities remaining or even 




Table 7.   Changes to the ACCP Five-Year Contract Bonus (FY2010 through FY2014) (from Kelso, 2014) 
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f. Contract Requirements and Termination 
The design of the current implementation of the ADHRB is to provide incentives 
for qualified aviators to remain on active duty through their DH tours. In order to meet 
this obligation, officers who accept the ACCP contract agree not to voluntarily resign, 
retire, or terminate their flight status prior to completing the obligated service. They must 
also accept their inclusion in the DH screening process, and those who are selected for 
DH must accept and complete the entire DH tour, if that requires extension of service 
beyond the ACCP-incurred MSR. Aviators who fail to screen for DH twice are 
authorized to continue receiving ACCP as long as they meet the other requirements found 
in the Navy guidance (e.g., remain in an aviation-designated assignment, remain eligible 
for ACIP) (NPC, 2014d). 
Failure to complete these obligated service requirements may result in termination 
of the contract and possible recoupment of bonus payments. Additionally, there are other 
conditions by which future payments will cease, but repayment will not likely be 
demanded. These conditions include: 
• Medical grounding or other suspension of flight status, which is neither the result of 
misconduct, nor willful neglect, nor incurred during a period of unauthorized absence 
• Twice failing to select for advancement to the next pay grade 
• Separation from Active Duty by operation of law or DOD policy, except separations 
for cause 
• Re-designation, or selection for lateral transfer, after twice failing to select for DH 
(CNO, 2005a) 
Recent historic (FY-2004 through FY-2010) rates for early-
termination/revocation of contract have averaged around 15.7% of the total ACCP 
contracts offered. While the Navy does recover some of the money issued, nearly $4.5 
million will be spent annually on retaining aviators who will not complete the DH tour 
for which they accepted the bonus (Kelso, 2014). The most common reasons for early 
termination of the ACCP contract are failure to promote to the next pay grade (typically 
O-4) or failure to select for DH. Other reasons include opting out of the DH selection 
process or declining orders to follow-on DH assignments. Medical-related 
disqualification or non-performance-related issues represent relatively uncommon causes 
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for non-completion of ACCP contracts. Additionally, detachment for cause only 
represents less than 4% of the ACCP contract terminations. Table 8 shows the different 




Table 8.   Causes for Early Termination/Revocation of ACCP (from Kelso, 2014) 
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III. INTRODUCTION TO AUCTIONS 
In this chapter, various general auctions, terminology, auction rules, and bidding 
strategies are briefly discussed. Section A provides background regarding auctions and 
market mechanisms while section B offers guidance on the roles and terminology of 
auctions. Section C discusses the perceptions of value among buyers and sellers; section 
D discusses determining winners in an auction; and section E provides additional 
guidance on bidding strategy While this chapter should provide guidance on how auction 
theory and rules may be applied to Naval Aviation, readers should reference Krishna 
(2009) or Klemperer (2004) if they require more information on auction theory and 
reference Coughlan and Gates (2012) for application of auction theory on military force 
management. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Auctions represent one of the oldest and most-used market mechanisms to sell 
goods and services. Babylonians auctioned off wives; Greeks auctioned mine 
concessions; and auctions existed in ancient Rome for everything from war booty to 
debtor’s property (Klemperer, 2004). They also enjoy a current use for the sale of 
livestock and land purchases, mineral rights, government contracts, and even frequency 
spectrum rights (Milgram, 2004). Auctions are defined by modern economists as an 
“economic mechanism whose purpose is the allocation of goods and the formation of 
prices for those goods via a process known as bidding.” (Fine, 2008) A common element 
among the various auctions is that information asymmetry is sufficient to dissuade all 
parties from agreeing on a fixed price prior to the transaction (Krishna, 2009). 
Information asymmetry may be the uncertainty or risk of anticipating the value the other 
parties place on the object or service. 
Differences in compensation schemes may result in inefficient market 
mechanisms. Utilizing exchanges that use posted-price transactions (i.e., where one party 
establishes a price at which he or she is sufficiently willing to buy or sell the product or 
service) brings to mind the Navy’s current aviation retention efforts. As illustrated in 
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Figure 3, in order to retain the community’s goal of 50 aviators, the Navy must offer an 
$80,000 bonus. This precise amount, however,  is not known beforehand, which may 
result in retention shortfalls when there is an insufficient bonus amount or excess aviator 
numbers when bonuses are above the required price. 
 
Figure 3.  The Importance of Retention Bonus Precision (after Coughlan & 
Gates, 2012) 
This type of imprecision has been demonstrated in recent retention requirements 
among individual aviation community requirements (Figure 4). While overall ACCP 
retention goals have been met, some communities experienced retention at 94% above 
goals. Others, such as VAQ pilot and VFA NFO, have only achieved 36% of desired 




Figure 4.  FY-2013 ACCP Bonus Amounts versus Aviator Retention for Select 
Communities (after Kelso, 2014) 
Understanding the shortcomings of the current retention system, Coughlan and 
Gates (2012) discuss auction design and its application to military retention in the Navy. 
Design considerations that were deemed important for auction mechanism development 
are shown in Figure 5. The highlighted portions are features that are best suited for 
mechanisms designed specifically for military retention. These characteristics are 
inherent as foundational elements in the development of the auction mechanisms 




Figure 5.  Force Management Auction Design Considerations (from Coughlan 
& Gates, 2012)  
B. AUCTION ROLES AND TERMINOLOGY 
While auctions may vary in the type of object being offered, rules employed, and 
type of auction implemented, all share common terminology and roles. The following 
represents a miscellany of previous theses conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Information is used courtesy of the following thesis authors: William N. Filip, Tony K. 
Verenna, Eric W. Kelso, and Henning H. Homb. 
1. Roles 
Among all auctions, individuals fall under the roles of bidders, bid takers, sellers, 
and buyers. Bidders are the individuals or groups competing against each other to win the 
auction. Bid takers are the entities that receive the offers made by the bidders. The seller 
is the individual or interested party who offers goods or services at the determined market 
price. The buyer, meanwhile, seeks to gain that good or service. Finally, in any auction 
that is completed there is at least one winner namely, the bidder awarded either the object 
or service being auctioned or the right to provide the object of the auction (Verenna, 
2007). 
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2. Pairing Auctions to Contracts 
Auctions may utilize different rules and processes, depending on the type of 
transactions occurring between parties. Figure 6 summarizes various types of market 
mechanisms that would match the transactions between a variety of sellers and buyers. 
Transactions between single parties rarely require any form of auction but instead rely on 
negotiation (Coughlan & Gates, 2012). Multiple buyers and sellers typically rely on non-
auction transaction mechanisms with very few exceptions. Some form of auction is 
therefore typically found in the transactions between single buyers and multiple buyers or 
single buyers and multiple sellers (Coughlan & Gates, 2012). 
 
Figure 6.  Varieties of Transaction Mechanisms (from Coughlan & Gates, 
2012) 
a. Forward versus Reverse Auction 
(1) Forward auction 
Forward auctions represent the most common and well understood type of 
auction. This type of auction represents the style of most famous auction houses (i.e., 
Christie’s of London or Sotheby’s) and on-line auction sites like e-bay. It involves a 
single seller and multiple potential buyers who provide bids to purchase the good or 
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service. With these types of auctions, bidders compete and drive prices higher, while 
winning bidders are those who submit the highest bids (Coughlan & Gates, 2012). 
(2) Reverse auction. 
Reverse auctions match one buyer and multiple sellers in which sellers look to 
provide a good or service. This type of auction may be found among procurement 
contracts, in which several contractors provide bids to sell their goods or services to a 
single buyer, such as defense weapons contracts. In this case, however, competition 
among bidders reduces the price and causes the winning bidder to submit the lowest bids 
(Coughlan & Gates, 2012). 
b. Single versus Multi-Unit Auction 
(1) Single-Unit Auctions 
In single-unit auctions, only one good or service is auctioned during the auction 
period. Either the seller offers only a single good or service (single-unit supply) in a 
forward auction or the buyer only wants to acquire a single object (single-unit demand) in 
a reverse auction. Single auctions have been well documented and researched (Klemper, 
2004; Krishna, 2009; McAfee & McMillan, 1987) but conducting multiple iterations of 
the single-unit auction becomes unmanageable and limits its practicality among the 
auctions discussed in previous and current NPS research. 
(2) Multi-Unit Auctions 
As implied by the name, multi-unit auctions involve several items at one time. 
This type of auction represents either the instance in which the seller, in a forward 
auction, offers multiple units of the same goods or services (multi-unit supply) or when 
the buyer, in a reverse auction, seeks to attain multiple units of the good or service (multi-
unit demand). Multi-unit auctions should not always be considered multiple instances of 
single-unit auctions since the value of the item at auction may depend on other objects or 
items for auction that can operate as either complements or substitutes (Verenna, 2007). 
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C. DETERMINING BIDDING STRATEGIES 
As previously mentioned, one aspect of auctions involves asymmetric information 
in which participants possess differing knowledge about the item for auction or the value 
other participants place on that item. The type of information disparity branches out into 
two models. First, common-value auctions involve auctions in which all bidders would 
assign the same value to the object in question if all of the participants knew the true 
nature of the item for sale. Second, private-value auctions represent auctions in which 
each bidder has assigned independent and possibly varied valuations of the object based 
on personal preference. While both models are often intertwined, assessing both models 
provides insight into how bidders may establish different methods of values and therefore 
their bid (Homb, 2006). 
1. Common-Value Auctions 
For a common-value auction, the object’s value would be consistent among all 
participants, if all of the information concerning the item was available to both buyer and 
seller. Individual participants, however, may possess different information about the 
potential value of the item. The most common example of this type of auction is the sale 
of mineral rights. Unable to precisely determine the exact quantities of minerals found on 
a plot of land, potential buyers must develop their own estimates of the value of the 
mineral rights. Bidders who anticipate large reserves of minerals will develop higher bids 
than those who suspect smaller quantities. Discovering other bidders’ values may also 
change potential bids as patterns within the bidding process may demonstrate the 
prevalence of asymmetric information (Homb, 2006). This is best demonstrated by a 
winner’s curse in which auction winners realized they overvalued the goods and suffer a 
loss as a result of over-bidding (Homb, 2006). 
2. Independent Private-Value Auction 
For an independent private-value auction, bidders develop a private and 
fundamental value for the item. An individual’s value or estimate does not change based 
on information from the value that other bidders place on the object in question. While 
the bidder may adjust bids during these types of auctions, the purpose of the change 
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reflects strategy and not differences in the intrinsic value of the item (McAfee & 
McMillan, 1987). Common examples include sale of memorabilia for fans and tickets for 
sporting events (Homb, 2006). 
3. Reserve Price 
Reserve price represents the minimum price a bid taker, during a forward auction, 
would accept for the exchange of providing a good or service. In a reverse auction, 
reserve price ensures the maximum price a bid taker would be willing to pay in exchange 
for a good or service. During a forward auction, bid takers should not accept offers below 
reserve prices since they will receive no profit from the transaction. Similarly, bid takers 
should not accept offers above their reserve price during a reverse auction. An offer 
exactly equal to the bid taker’s reserve price represents a scenario in which the bid taker 
would be equally likely to accept or reject the offer (Verenna, 2007). 
4. Reservation Price 
Reservation price refers to the maximum value a bidder establishes for a good or 
service being auctioned (forward auction) or the minimum value a bidder determines to 
provide an object (reverse auction). Just like the reserve price, bidders should not refrain 
from offering bids above their reservation price during a forward auction, while ensuring 
that no bids are offered below their reservation price in a reverse auction. An offer that 
matches the bidder’s reservation price would result in a situation where the bidder is 
equally willing to have offers accepted or rejected (Verenna, 2007). 
D. DETERMINING WINNER AND PRICE 
The procedures by which the winner is determined and the price required for 
payment fall into four categories: ascending-bid, descending-bid, first-price sealed bid, 
and second-price sealed bid. No matter the type of category, each format utilizes bids to 
seek out a potential buyer’s value of the object and then determines the winner and price 
based solely on the information available. The type of object or the contract details are 
not important nor are the particulars concerning the bidders. Neither of these details 
provides any influence on who wins the auction or how much is paid, as long as the 
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auction is conducted fairly. Therefore, any format of the auction can be used to sell any 
type or class of good and services (Krishna, 2009). 
Additionally, any format of auction should provide, on average, revenue 
equivalence. Known as the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, it states:  
Assume each of a given number of risk-neutral potential buyers of an 
object has a privately known signal independently drawn from a common, 
strictly increasing, atomless distribution. Then any [emphasis added] 
auction mechanism in which (i) the object always goes to the buyer with 
the highest signal, and (ii) any bidder with the lowest-feasible signal 
expects zero surplus, yields the same expected revenue (and results in each 
bidder making the same expected payment as a function of her signal). 
(Klemperer, 2004, p. 17) 
Therefore, auction developers can focus on bidders’ marginal revenues since 
optimal auctions allocate objects to bidders with the highest marginal revenue and not 
just on the highest (or lowest) bid; instead, they focus on the winning bidder’s reservation 
price (Klemperer, 2004). 
(1) Ascending-Bid Auction 
The ascending-bid auction, known as an English auction, is the mostly commonly 
used and recognized format used for the selling of goods (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). 
These auctions may be carried out in a turn-based process or in real-time action, in which 
bids are submitted through gestures, orally, or even electronically. Bidders are not even 
required to be present at the auction. What differentiates this format from others is that 
the price for the object continues to increase incrementally until only one buyer remains. 
The buyer must then pay the final price quoted by the bid taker. Since each potential 
buyers knows the current price and can discern potential information concerning value 
other bidders place on the value of the object by observing submitted bids, this format is 
also considered an open auction format (Krishna, 2009). 
(2) Descending-Bid Auction 
The Dutch auction or descending-bid auction represents a different variant of the 
open auction format. The format bears a resemblance to the ascending-bid auction, except 
that the sellers start at a speculative price, presumably above the reservation price of any 
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potential bidder, and then incrementally decreases the price until a willing buyer is 
identified. Buyers may glean some information regarding the value other bidders may 
place on the object being placed for auction; however, this data only supplies the bidder 
with the value for which other potential buyers are unwilling to pay for receipt of the 
object. Once a bid is submitted for auction, the auction is completed and no other bids are 
offered (Krishna, 2009). 
(3) First-Price (or Discriminatory-Price) Sealed-Bid Auction 
Potential buyers privately submit independent bids for the object being auctioned 
during a first-price sealed-bid auction. Unlike ascending- or descending-bid formats, 
bidders are not able to determine the value other bidders have placed on the object in 
question. Each bidder may only submit a single bid that cannot be changed. After bids 
have been collected, the bidder who submitted the highest bid is announced as the winner 
and pays the bid price (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). During multi-supply auctions, each 
item may be paid at discriminatory prices so that each winning bid matches the highest 
bid for each individual object. 
(4) Second-Price (or Uniform-Price) Sealed-Bid Auction 
Second-price sealed-bid auctions match the first-price sealed-bid format so that 
bidders provide independent non-publicized bids for the auction item. After bids are 
collected, the winner is announced as the bidder submitting the highest bid. However, the 
winner does not pay the bid amount but instead pays the amount offered in the second-
highest bid. Research finds that this aspect of the design elicits a bidder’s true reservation 
price (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). 
E. BIDDING STRATEGIES 
(1) First-Price Auctions 
As noted above, the winner in these types of auctions pays or receives whatever 
the bid is offered. Therefore, bidders must determine what the likelihood is of that bids 
from other bidders will maximize profits if those bidders win the auction. Rational 
bidders would then submit a bid that maximizes their chances to win the auction while 
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providing reasonable profit or surplus. First-price auctions are not incentive compatible, 
indicating that individuals may not bid their reservation price if their bidding strategy 
allows them to maximize profits by bidding below their reservation price in a forward 
auction. 
(2) Second-Price Auctions 
While the highest bid is used to determine the winner in these auction formats, 
amount paid or received is dependent on the bids of others. Therefore, bidders are likely 
to submit bids equal to their own reservation price. Under-bidding or over-bidding in a 
second-price forward auction, as depicted in Figure 7, provides no results in which the 
outcome becomes more favorable to the bidder (Myung, 2013). Second-price auctions are 
incentive compatible, meaning that individuals truthfully reveal private information 
regarding the value of the item. 
 
Figure 7.  Second-Price Auction Bidding Strategy (from Myung, 2013) 
 49 
Failure to bid the true reservation price may lead to risk of losing the auction to a 
price below the amount the bidder was willing to pay or invoking the winner’s curse, in 
which he or she  pays more than the perceived value of the object.  
F. COLLUSION 
Knowing that each participant may have information asymmetry, individual 
potential buyers may attempt to collude in auctions in order to keep prices at a minimum 
(in a forward auction) or a maximum (in a reverse auction). Collusion may occur through 
signals among bidders or the bid itself during an open auction. Bidders who are not 
participating in the collusion may be forced to pay higher prices compared to cooperation 
among the other bidders. In sealed-bid auctions, collusion is rare, though possible, 
because there is no communication between players in the bidding process; therefore, 
collusion requires pre-agreement concerning bids (Verenna, 2007). During uniform-price 
auctions, submitting bids that deviate from the collusive agreement will be severely 
punished since any influential bidder attempting to obtain more than the agreed share 
requires all bidders to pay very high prices (Klemperer, 2004).  
Sellers (or buyers) may attempt to thwart collusion by 1) setting a reserve price, 
2) removing the item being auctioned if the collusion is detected prior to or during the 
auction process, 3) removing the suspected colluders from the auction, or 4) artificially 

















IV. MARKET-BASED COMPENSATION MECHANISMS 
In this chapter, three auction mechanisms are discussed: the uniform-price auction 
and two variants, the quality adjusted discount (QUAD) auction and the combinatorial 
retention auction mechanism (CRAM). The research and work of Myung (2013) and 
Coughlan, Gates, and Myung (2013) into the formation and description of these auction 
mechanisms forms the basis of most of the characteristics and features of potential 
auction mechanisms for use in the military retention system. 
Auctions offer market mechanisms for items that are hard to quantify or 
objectively value, or when information asymmetry exists. Examples of these items 
include readiness, market labor, or individual propensity to remain on active duty. 
Therefore, auctions retain favorable features for improving efficiency in current Naval 
Aviator retention programs. Additionally, the aforementioned auction mechanisms 
provide behavior-seeking features that are conducive to principles required for fair and 
efficient auctions. These principles include allocative efficiency, cost minimization, and 
failure freeness. These mechanisms also support values noted as critical to any DOD 
retention program, specifically: 
Egalitarianism [emphasis added]: The military pay charts reflect the 
historic precedents that service members are paid based on rank, position, 
and time in service that is equivalent across services and communities. 
These mechanisms, with the exception of QUAD, provide the same bonus 
to all retained aviators.  
Transparency and ease of use [emphasis added]: The mechanisms must 
be designed so that all participants are able to understand how the process 
works, and they must minimize opportunities or incentives for aviators to 
try to obtain strategic advantage. 
Low transaction cost [emphasis added]: Given the extended 
deployments and potentially limited availability of aviators to gather in a 
single geographic area or over a long period of time, service members 
must be able to provide a single bid. The aviator also does not need 
additional information to provide an informed bid, outside of personal 
valuations of their labor and potentially any non-monetary incentives 
(Coughlan et al., 2013). 
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A. UNIFORM-PRICE AUCTION 
Uniform-price auction represents a type of second-price auction format for 
multiple unit goods. For the purpose of this research, the uniform-price auction is 
conducted in a sealed-bid format, single-supply, multi-demand reverse auction with the 
Naval Aviation leadership acting as the bid taker and looking to retain a specified number 
of Naval Aviation officers for Active Duty. The sellers are the Naval Aviation officers 
who submit the bids they are willing to accept for the commitment to serve an additional 
period of service. Since the auction precisely selects the number of aviators desired, this 
auction mechanism enables the Navy to eliminate economic rent related to over-retention 
while minimizing risk associated with retention shortfalls. Due to  the revenue 
equivalence theorem, this mechanism also provides an equitable uniform bonus while 
maintaining the same cost of a discretionary auction, in which retained aviators are paid 
exactly their submitted bid (Kelso, 2014). 
Although not necessary, the Navy would announce the quantity of Naval Aviators 
it requires to retain for the period of service, and then collect sealed bids from eligible 
individuals who are willing to be retained. These bids are then ranked from lowest to 
highest and the number of lowest bids match the quantity of aviators needed for retention. 
All retained aviators are given the same payout. This amount equates to the cut-off bid, 
the first excluded bidder’s price. 
Uniform-price auctions are developed so that there are no incentives for a 
participant to over-bid or under-bid the true reservation price. Table 9 illustrates how, in 
all scenarios, over-bidding or under-bidding led to outcomes that were unfavorable 
compared to bidding truthfully.  
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Table 9.   Uniform-Price Auction Bidding Strategy (after Myung, 2013) 
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1. Model Description 
Aviators ( iA ) are characterized by their bids ( ib ) and reservation prices ( ); the 
reservation price represents the minimum bonus they would accept to agree to remain on 
Active Duty and serve a Department Head tour. The objective of iA  is to submit a bid ( ib
) that maximizes payoff ( ip ), the cash bonus. The number of aviators participating in the 
auction is denoted by N. The Navy’s objective is retaining M of N  aviators. 
The sealed bids are received during the auction period and ranked from lowest to 
highest { }( )1Ni ib =  and, without loss of generality, let  if . The M lowest bids are 
retained; in the case that multiple bids of Mb are submitted, the tie will be broken by 
selecting a bid or bids at random to ensure retention goals are not exceeded. The cutoff 
bid is then set to 1Mb +  or the first excluded bid. Aviators for whom ib 1Mb +  are awarded 
a bonus equal to 1Mb + , (the cash payment required by the first aviator not selected for 
retention) and incur the required service obligation. Aviators who are not selected receive 
no bonus but are still eligible to remain in the aviation community. Alternatively, they 
may laterally transfer to another community or reserve component or separate from 
Active Duty at the completion of their MSR. 
2. Example Auction 
As a notional example of the uniform-price auction, Table 10 shows the bids from 
15 aviators who have submitted bids to remain for additional service. Only eight aviators 
are required to be retained. In this example, the ninth lowest bid of $121,000 is the cut-
off bid. All aviators with bids less than this amount are retained and those aviators are 
each awarded a $121,000 retention bonus and incur additional years of obligated service. 
The total cost to retain the required number of aviators is $968,000. 
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Table 10.   Uniform-Price Auction Example (after Kelso, 2014) 
B. QUALTITY-ADJUSTED DISCOUNT AUCTION 
The Quality-Adjusted Discount (QUAD) auction developed by Myung (2013) 
represents a variant form of the uniform-price auction. The mechanism is completed in 
the same manner as the simple uniform-price auction mentioned in Section A; however, 
the process by which bids and payouts are determined differs. These slight but key 
differences enable the buyer (the Navy) to increase the efficiency of the auction by 
authorizing special, preferential treatment to different, specific classes of bidders. In 
addition to the benefits from the simple uniform-price auction, the QUAD mechanism 
promotes a meritocracy among the Navy Aviation Enterprise, in which the Navy controls 
for the quality of the aviators selected without significant increases to the overall cost 
(Myung, 2013). 
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For this research, the preferential treatment was offered by discounting bids of 
higher-quality aviators, or those aviators who are more likely to be selected for DH. This 
nominal discount reduces the bids of aviators whose quality scores exceeds thresholds 
established and monitored by the Navy. Since this discounted bid lowers the requirement 
by which they would be selected for retention and payment, this effort increases the 
probability of retaining higher-quality aviators compared to the aviators who do not 
demonstrate quality that exceed the established quality thresholds. Like the simple 
uniform-price auction, a pre-determined number of winners is determined by the 
selection of the lowest bid equal to the number of aviators that the Navy is looking to 
retain. All winning bidders are paid the amount determined by the first excluded bid and 
those whose quality scores exceeded pre-determined thresholds receive an additional 
amount equal to the amount their bids were discounted. 
Like other uniform-price auctions, bidding strategies favor those who submit bids 
that are truthful and equal to the reservation price. Table 11 depicts the possible outcomes 
of differing strategies of aviators utilizing a QUAD auction. Bidders do not improve any 
outcome by bidding an amount that differs from the true reservation price. 
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Table 11.   QUAD Auction Bidding Strategy (after Myung, 2013) 
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1. Model Description 
Aviators ( iA ) are characterized by their bids ( ib ), reservation prices ( ir ) and a 
quality factor ( iq ). The objective of iA  is to maximize payoff ( ip ), the cash bonus, of 
their bids. The number of aviators participating in the auction is denoted N. The Navy’s 
objective is to retain M of N  aviators. The Navy is able to assign bid assignments ( X or
Y ) to bidders with quality levels above some quality thresholds ( xq  or yq ) where Y  > X
and yq  > xq . Therefore, higher  implies higher quality in our setup. During this 
research, focus was placed on a simplified model with four categories but there is 
flexibility to adjust the number of quality thresholds and subsequent bid adjustments. The 
adjusted bids ( ) are calculated in the following manner: 
*
i i x
i i X i Y
i i y
b if q q
b b X if q q q
b Y if q q
 <
 = − ≤ < 
 − ≥   
The sealed bids are received during the auction period and ranked from lowest to 
highest { }( )* 1Ni ib =  and without loss of generality, let  if . The M lowest bids 
are retained; in the case that multiple bids of *Mb are submitted, the tie will be broken by 
selecting a bid or bids with the highest iq  to ensure retention goals are not exceeded. If 
the quality scores are then tied, the tie is randomly broken. The cut-off bid is then set to
*
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 = + ≤ < 
 + ≥   
All retained aviators will receive, at a minimum, the bonus amount submitted in 
their bid while most will receive a bonus larger than the initial bid. This implies that 
i ip b≥  if retained. Aviators who are not selected receive no bonus but are still eligible to 
remain in the aviation community. Alternatively, they may laterally transfer to another 
community or reserve component, or separate from Active Duty at the completion of 
their MSR. 
2. Example Auction 
Table 12 provides an example of the QUAD auction. The bids and retention goals 
match the example found in the simple uniform-price auction example in Table 9. Quality 
determination was illustrated utilizing a 4-point scale for each bidder. Bids for aviators 
with iq ≥  4 are discounted by $40,000, while aviators with 3 4iq≤ < receive a nominal 
$20,000 discount. All other bids receive no discount or adjustments. After adjusting for 
the discounts, the bids are re-ranked and the cut-off established at * 1Mb +  = $89,000; while 
there were two adjusted rankings of 8, the retained bid was the bid with the higher quality 
factor (4 vs. 2), so the first excluded bid was for the bid of $89,000. All retained aviators 
received this bonus, while those who received the nominal discounts received the bonus 
plus the additional adjustment of $20,000 and $40,000. Utilizing the QUAD mechanism 
resulted in a 31.25% increase in the average quality of retained aviators, while total and 
average cost decreased by 14%. 
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Table 12.   QUAD Auction Example (after Kelso, 2014) 
C. COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM 
CRAM is a reverse multi-unit auction developed by Coughlan, Gates, and Myung 
(Coughlan et al., 2013), where the auction incorporates both monetary and non-monetary 
incentives (NMIs). These NMIs may include examples such as geographic stability for 
follow-on orders, career intermission programs, and post-graduate educational 
opportunities, in addition to whatever other future policy may develop. Utilizing CRAM 
should meet retention goals just like the simple uniform-price auction, but CRAM also 
provides the opportunity to reduce costs by retaining aviators who receive utility from the 
NMIs instead of receiving a simple monetary payment.  
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Like both the simple uniform-price auction and the QUAD auction, each aviator 
submits a bid for the cash bonus for additional obligated service; in addition, aviators 
select which NMIs they want to receive as well. Sealed bids are collected and the seller’s 
bid is developed from the combination of cash and NMIs. A pre-determined quantity of 
offers is selected from the lowest bids and the accepted offers receive a bonus equal to 
the cost of the first excluded bid. The actual bonus composition includes some cash 
amount from the cut-off bid, plus any NMIs selected, minus the cost of those NMIs. 
Refer to the model description for the exact computation.   
In this type of auction, since NMIs are included, optimal bidding strategies must 
include the value of the NMI for each individual. The monetary value will equal the 
reservation price minus the value of the combination of NMIs. Individuals should, 
therefore, only select NMIs where the value of the NMI exceeds the cost of the NMI. See 
Myung for additional insight into bidding strategies. 
1. Model Description 
Aviators ( iA ) are characterized by their bids ( ib ) which includes cash bonus and 
some set of NMIs if desired, and reservation prices ( ir ). The objective of iA  is to 
maximize payoff ( ip ), the cash bonus and NMI combination(s), by submitting their bids. 
The number of aviators participating in the auction is denoted by N. The Navy’s 
objective is retaining M of N  aviators. For this research’s example, focus was placed on 
a simplified case of three NMIs, ( e , f  and g ), but there is flexibility to adjust the 
number of NMIs to match strategic manpower goals and opportunities. Aviators may 
select any combination of these NMIs, and each NMI increases the bid by a 
corresponding amount, cE , cF  , and cG  which are the costs of providing these NMIs. 
Each aviator provides personal valuation for the NMIs offered, iE  iF  and iG . The 
adjusted bids ( ) are calculated in the following manner: 
{ }*i i c c cb b eE fF gG= + + +  
where e, f, g each = 1 if NMI selected; 0 if NMI not selected  
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The sealed bids are received during the auction period and ranked from lowest to 
highest { }( )* 1Ni ib =  and, without loss of generality, let  if . The M lowest bids 
are retained; in the case that multiples bids of *Mb are submitted, the tie will be broken 




1Mb +  are selected to receive a bonus, selected for retention, and incur the required 
service obligation. Bonuses are bestowed in the following manner: 
{ }* 1 ( ) ( ) ( )i M i c i c i Cp b e E E f F F g G G+= + − + − + −
 
where e, f, g each = 1if NMI selected; 0 if NMI not selected  
All retained aviators will receive, at a minimum, the bonus amount submitted in 
his or her bid while most will receive a bonus larger than the initial bid ( ). CRAM 
is developed so that aviators would only select NMIs when the value each aviator derives 
from receiving it exceeds the cost of selecting it (e.g. ).  
Aviators who are not selected receive no bonus but are still eligible to remain in 
the aviation community. Alternatively, they may laterally transfer to another community, 
reserve component, or separate from Active Duty at the completion of their MSR. 
2. Example Auction 
Table 13 provides an example of the CRAM auction. The retention goals match 
the example found in the simple uniform-price auction example in Table 9. Additionally, 
overall reservation prices are held the same, indicating no change in the reservation 
values each aviator places on the obligated service. The three available NMIs are listed as
e , f , and g , each with an associated cost of $10,000. Aviators who select any or all of 
the NMIs have the associated costs added to their overall CRAM bid. Aviators that did 
not select any NMIs received no adjustment to their original bids.  
After adjusting for the adjustments, the bids are re-ranked and the cutoff 
established at * 1Mb +  = $91,000. Retained aviators receive the NMIs requested and $91,000 
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less the cost of the requested NMIs. In this example, aviators received excess utility from 
the NMIs while the Navy reduced the total monetary costs by $160,000, for a savings of 
16.5% compared to the simple uniform-price auction. 
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Table 13.   CRAM Auction Example (after Kelso, 2014) 
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V. AVIATON RETENTION SURVEY AND METHODOLOGY 
Utilizing a comparable study from previous research (Kelso, 2014), a survey of 
Naval Aviators from Lieutenant Junior Grade (O-2) to Commander (O-5) was developed 
to compare the current ACCP program against three auction mechanisms: Uniform-Price 
Auction, QUAD Auction, and CRAM. The survey was designed to collect individual 
performance history, to include FITREP promotion recommendations and career 
milestones, as well as reservation prices for agreeing to serve additional years of 
obligated service. Individual preferences for specific non-monetary incentives (NMIs) 
were addressed and respective values for each NMI were assigned by each respondent. 
Qualitative assessments of various aspects of Navy life and their impact on propensity to 
remain in service were asked to establish possible elements of retention issues. This data 
was then used to model all three auction mechanisms based on projected retention rates 
and costs from FY-2013 under the current ACCP system in order to determine market 
prices and values. 
A. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY 
An online survey was developed utilizing LimeSurvey, an on-line open source 
survey development and delivery program approved by NPS. Utilizing a previous survey 
developed by LCDR Eric Kelso, the survey questions were re-evaluated to ensure that the 
participant would provide 1) quality metrics, given as a representative history of their 
performance in Naval aviation, 2) reservation price for a uniform-price based auction for 
extending their service obligation through a DH tour, and 3) associative desire and value 
of two NMIs. Since Kelso (2014) had established a baseline survey and had pre-tested the 
drafts with both groups of Naval Aviators and help from Naval Personnel Research, 
Studies, and Technology (NPRST), further pretesting was determined as not required.  
Two of the major issues with the survey distributed by Kelso included incomplete 
sample coverage and selection bias. Kelso (2014) was only able to utilize 98 total 
responses in his research and was unable to get a statistically significant number of 
responses from several communities. His survey was distributed among Naval Aviators at 
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the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and not all communities were represented 
proportionally. Kelso was unable to conduct adequate analysis on these communities and 
was unable to draw conclusions regarding the market values of these communities. 
Likewise, Kelso only distributed his survey to individuals who had agreed to 
attend NPS in-residence or through a distance learning program while incurring 
additional obligated service (CNO, 1991). Responses to the questions posed in that 
survey have the potential of selection bias, indicating that the sample may not be 
representative of the population. 
In order to remedy both the sample coverage and the selection bias, this study 
determined that a larger sample was required. In order to reach as many Navy aviators as 
possible, permission was requested of Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) to conduct 
a survey of all active duty Navy pilots and Navy Flight Officers between the rank of O-2 
to O-5. After obtaining approval from CNAF to conduct the survey, as directed by 
OPNAVINST 5330.8C (CNO, 2008), approval was received from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Institutional Review Board (IRB) to administer the survey. 
Receiving a list from PERS-34 of Navy aviators’ emails, emails were sent out containing 
a link to the survey directly to officers identified as Naval Aviators, indicating they had a 
1310 or 1320 designator. The survey was open to participants from January 26, 2015 to 
February 9, 2015; a follow-up email was sent February 2, 2015 to individuals who had 
not completed the survey. Along with the link to the survey, a unique token was included 
in the original email to ensure that only those who had been emailed the survey could fill 
out the survey and that no duplicate submissions were made (see Appendix D for a copy 
of the survey and survey questions). 
After the responses were returned by the participants, individual responses were 
reviewed and cleaned to allow for appropriate analysis. The responses from the Kelso 
study were merged with the responses from this survey to establish a database of answers 
that included both NPS students and non-students. This merging was accomplished to 
reduce selection bias and ensure a representative sample. 
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B.  POPULATION AND SAMPLE STATISTICS 
A total of 9,588 survey invitations were sent out to Naval Aviators. Out of the 
2,555 responses, 2,141 provided full responses and only two officers opted out of the 
survey. Those who had selected a parent community that no longer exists (i.e., VS or HC) 
were not included in the determination of reservation price or quality ratings. These 
responses were added to the 175 individual who provided partial answers from Kelso’s 
survey (2014). 
Table 14 provides a summary of the sample personnel demographics for this 
survey as well as the population demographics of Naval Aviation.  Eighty nine percent of 
the respondents identified as male compared to 93% currently in Naval Aviation, 78% 
reported their marital status as married or in a civil union; 42% of the respondents had 
achieved a master’s degree, and most respondents (~83%) described themselves as white. 
Race did not match several of the Naval Aviation population since Hispanic was offered 
as a race. The Navy considers Hispanic an ethnicity and not a race so there are overlaps 
between these categories. 
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Table 14.   Personnel Demographics from Survey and Naval Aviation 
Population (from personal email communication from OPNAV N134, 
2015) 
Table 15 provides a summary of the career demographics of our survey as well as 
the Naval Aviation population. Nearly 73% of the respondent total was pilots, which is 
consistent with the overall population.  The majority was O-3 (Lieutenant) in rank, and 
the majority of individuals had attended the U.S. Naval Academy or Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (36.5% and 30.1%, respectively). O-2 was under-represented in the 
sample while O-5 was over-represented. This may be due to the fact that many O-2 pilots 
and NFOs have not yet considered long-term career choices and therefore, did not 
respond to this survey. 
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Table 15.   Career Demographics from Survey and Naval Aviation Population 
(from personal email communication from OPNAV N134, 2015) 
C. ESTIMATION OF PARAMETERS 
1. Uniformed-Price Auction Bids 
In order to determine reservation prices for individuals in the sample group, a 
brief description of the uniformed-price auction was provided and a notional example of 
how the Navy could use a possible auction for the ACCP program. The question posed to 
respondents read as follows: “Assume you are in a group of 140 aviators eligible to 
receive a retention bonus. If, under the system described above, the Navy’s goal is to 
retain 65 aviators, what is the amount you would likely submit for your bid (TOTAL 
bonus amount)?”  The ratio of 65 to 140 aviators was noted as sufficient for meeting 
community retention rates for DH requirements (Kelso, 2014). This thesis research 
included the following note: “This value should be the MINIMUM amount you would be 
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satisfied with in exchange for obligating to serve a DH tour.” Individuals were able to 
select incremental values ranging from “$0/No bonus required” to “More than 
$175,000/Do not wish to be retained” from a drop-down list. Amounts up to $175,000 
were included due to the Navy pursuing legislation to increase ACCP amounts from 
$25,000 per year to $35,000 per year, which equates to $175,000 for a five-year contract 
(Kelso, 2014). Summary of the responses grouped by individual community are shown in 
Table 16. Those individuals who selected “More than $175,000/Do not wish to be 
retained” were not used in the determination of reservation price measures of central 
tendency.   
 
Table 16.   Reservation Price by Community 
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a. Bonus and Retention Matching 
All 2,316 respondents were asked questions regarding the bonus and retention 
matching and performance evaluation screening prior to bonus administration. 
Individuals were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:  
• Bonus amounts (dollars paid) should be tailored to meet the specific retention goals 
of individual communities. 
• In order to provide larger bonus amounts, the number of bonus contracts offered 
should not exceed retention goals. 
• Prior to awarding the bonus, performance records of applicants should be screened to 
determine suitability for DH. 
• Aviators with records of superior performance should be offered larger bonuses than 
other aviators in the same community. 
Responses included a spectrum of agreement from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree. As seen in Figure 8, the majority of respondents agreed that bonus amounts 
should be tailored to retention goals, that bonus contracts should not exceed retention 
goals, and that performance records of applicants should be screened prior to awarding a 
bonus. The fourth statement, that aviators with superior performance should be offered 
larger bonuses demonstrated a bimodal response. Most comments regarding this question 
indicated that aviators agree with the concept of meritocracy and that superior performing 
aviators should receive a larger bonus. Despite this agreement, other comments noted that 
determining superior performance remains an issue among aviators. While FITREPs 
remain the Navy’s preferred method of establishing performance evaluation, respondents 
mentioned that timing and career path adherence remains the methods by which aviators 
receive higher FITREP marks and that FITREPs should not be the only performance 
metric by which aviators are screened. Respondents also mentioned that a pre-screening 
process removes the need for an Aviation Department Head Selection Board (ADSHB) 






Figure 8.  Responses to Bonus and Retention Matching 
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b. Understanding of Auction-Based System 
Individuals in both surveys were asked if they understood the auction-based 
system that was described in both the example and uniform price auction question, 
including who was retained, how the bonus amount was determined, and how they should 
bid. Figure 9 shows the break-out of the 2,316 responses regarding this question. Of the 
responses, 70.9% claimed that they clearly or sufficiently understood the auction 
mechanism, 20.2% somewhat understood the mechanism, and only 9% either did not 
understand or provided no answer. 
 
Figure 9.   Individuals Evaluation of their understanding of the Auction 
Mechanism 
c. Value Determination Method 
Respondents in our survey were asked to rank various methods by which they 
would determine their individual ACCP bid. These methods included: 1) utilizing the 
winning bid from the previous year, 2) discuss the amount with aviators in my 
community, 3) evaluate the potential earnings from employment outside of the Navy, and 
4) some other method. As Figure 12 demonstrates, of the 2,141 responses, evaluating 














selecting this method as their primary method. Discussion with peers ranked as the next 
strongest method. These results seem to indicate that external labor markets do have an 




Figure 10.  Methods of Determining Auction Bid 
d. Inconsistent Bidding 
Respondents were also asked if they had already received an ACCP contract. If 
they had received a contract, a follow-up question regarding the total amount was asked.  
“Inconsistent” bidding was determined if the bid for the notional auction was greater in 
value than the ACCP amount they received for the contract that they had received in 
reality.  
Reservation price, as stated in Chapter III, is the minimum value a bidder 
determines to provide an object in a reverse auction. Since the individuals who received 
an ACCP contract from the current set-price format agreed to offer additional obligated 
service at the price listed in their ACCP contract and they were not forced to accept the 
bonus, this amount represents the minimum amount that they would receive in order to 
accept the contract. Otherwise, if the amount was too low, the individual would not need 

























understanding that the bonus amount was insufficient for the contracted obligations of the 
ACCP program.  
If this contract amount represents the individual’s unstated but inferred 
reservation price, then a rational neutral risk taker would accept this amount as their 
reservation price and therefore, during an auction, submit a bid equal to or less than the 
amount of the contract that they accepted prior. By submitting a bid greater than the 
amount they accepted for their obligated service, we determined they offered an 
“inconsistent” bid. As seen in Table 16, 42.0% of the total respondents offered bids 
greater than the contract amount they originally accepted for additional service. 
Percentages ranged from 29.4% (HSC) to 75.6% (VFA NFO). 
The reason behind this “inconsistent” bidding may be for several reasons. First, 
the individual who responded in both surveys were not actually accepting a contract and 
therefore there were no consequences for offering bids that did not match the individual 
reservation price. With no consequences, bidding strategies may be incongruent with 
implementation of the uniform-price, QUAD, and CRAM bidding strategies.   
Second, individuals who accepted the contract may have re-evaluated the value of 
their work outside of the Navy and determined that the ACCP contract they received was 
insufficient for the obligated service they incurred.  
Third, individuals may not have understood the auction mechanism sufficiently to 
understand that individuals should submit the minimum amount required to continue 
serving and that all winners of the auction receive amounts equal to or greater than their 
own bid. While respondents indicated they understood the auction mechanism (Figure 
11), their bidding strategy may indicate that the understanding of the auction was not well 
understood. 
Finally, respondents may have tried to influence future ACCP amounts for 
follow-on eligible aviators. By bidding higher, respondents are signaling to policy makers 
that current ACCP contracts are insufficient to meet retention goals. Possibly believing 
that this survey would be a method by which ACCP contract amounts are determined, 
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those who already accepted the bonus may have determined that personnel shortages 
would have direct and possibly dire consequences on their communities. 
  
Table 17.   “Inconsistent” Bids 
2. QUAD Quality Scores 
There is no current instruction or policy that determines an individual’s quality 
and assigns a singular numeric score. The values from the Aviation administrative board 
precept provide some guidance concerning qualities and career milestones that Navy 
leadership approves but this guidance provides latitude regarding scales and weights of 
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each of these achievements or milestones. Determination of an Aviation officer would 
likely be the decision for Navy leadership and policy makers. In order to determine 
quality scores, we used factors determined by NPC to affect the likelihood of being 
selected for Department Head. These factors were provided by the Aviation Department 
Head Selection Board lessons learned and provided guidance for a method for estimating 
an aviator’s quality rating. This method uses general categories but offers various weights 
for accomplishment in each category in the calculation. These categories were guided by 
Kelso’s research and attempts to match his Quality Method II from his previous research 
to determine quality determination. We utilized four categories: 
• Final FITREP ranking during first Sea Tour 
• First Shore Tour assignment 
• Final FITREP ranking during first Shore Tour 
• Other factors, composed of specific qualifications and experiences  
Additional factors considered included subsequent assignments (e.g., 
Disassociated Sea Tour, DH tour) and their final FITREP rankings. Since the ADHSB is 
likely to occur during an officer’s Disassociated Sea Tour, these factors were left out of 
determination. While these factors may be material in future determination of quality 
determination, they were left out of this research.  
a. Quality Method 
An individual’s quality ranking was determined by aggregating the quality scores 
from the four categories and applying weights commensurate with correlated status in 
DH selection rates. Using Kelso’s research as a starting point, we applied positive 
weights to those performance metrics that correlated to higher selection rates based on 
recent ADSHB lessons learned. Examples of this correlation include qualifying as a 
Weapons and Tactics Instructor/NSAWC shore tour and assignment to FRS or other 
production tours for a First Shore Tour. Negative weights were applied to factors that 
indicated less than average selection rates to include assignment to Individual Augment 
tours and OCONUS assignment. One major difference between this study’s performance 
metrics and the one developed by Kelso (2014) was the decision to apply a score of zero 
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to not observed FITREPs.  For any sea tour performance or other factors that were not 
answered in the survey, a score of zero was applied to that category. 
Singular values were assigned for all categories except for “Other Factors” which 
allowed for selection of several factors. Total scores could range from 15 (maximum) to -
3 (minimum). Table 18 summarizes the four categories and the associated weights. 
 
Table 18.   Quality Method Scale (after Kelso, 2014) 
b. Quality Method Scores  
Table 19 summarizes the results of the quality method scale across the different 
communities. Mean scores ranged from 4.78 (VQ (P) Pilot) to 8.40 (VAQ NFO) but the 
quality method offers scoring within communities- not across communities. One of the 
reasons that there may be differences between communities may be the lack of tactical 
qualifications for fixed wing shore based pilots, particularly weapons and tactics 
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instructor qualification. This method may be adjusted as necessary to accodomate 
individual community values and weights. These scores were determined utilizing 
lessons learned across all communities and therefore represent values appreciated across 
the NAE. 
 








c. Regression of Reservation Price to Quality Score 
We conducted a probit regression on viable ACCP bids and quality scores for 
each rank to determine if there was a correlation between quality score and desire to 
remain in service. None of models were statistically significant at p<.05. 
In order to determine if there is a linear relationship between quality ratings and 
reservation prices, we conducted linear regression between individual reservation price 
and total quality ratings. As seen in table 20, total quality score is not statistically related 
to the ACCP bid from the survey population.  
 
Table 20.   Linear Regression between ACCP Bid and Total Quality Score 
When we ran a linear regression including other factors such as rank, marriage 
status, race, education, community, and gender, we found that each additional increase in 
quality score (p<.01) increased bonus bids by $918.  Table 21 summarizes the results of 




Table 21.   Linear Regression of ACCP bid and Total Quality Score 
However, we found that if the regression was conducted only bids offered by 
individuals within different ranks, total quality no longer had a statistically significant 
impact on bonus bids. This rank impact may be caused by opportunities afforded by 
advanced rank. We found that senior rank (p<0.01) increased by 3.59 points for O-4 and 
3.96 for O-5 on quality score (Table 22) and that O3 bids (p<0.1) increased by $8700 and 
bids decreased by $12,000 for individuals with an O-5 rank (p<0.05) (Table 23). 
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Table 22.   Linear Regression of Impact of Rank on Quality Score 
 






When the model incorporates the components of the total quality score, only one 
of the components of the total score had a statistically significant impact on individual’s 
bids. As seen in Table 24, being a WTI (p<.05) decreased average bids by $7,129. 
 
Table 24.   Linear Regression of ACCP bid and Individual Components of the 
Total Quality Score 
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3.  CRAM Bids 
CRAM bids allow participants to accept non-monetary incentives (NMI) in lieu of 
equivalent cash amounts. To determine the value and impact NMIs would have on 
individual auction bids, this researcher proposed a series of questions regarding two 
specific NMIs and gauged respondents value and interest in these particular NMIs. These 
two NMIs included: 1) guarantee of a specific geographic duty station for the individual’s 
DH tour and 2) the opportunity to attend an in-residence graduate degree program prior to 
selection for DH. Individuals were also asked if there were any additional NMIs they 
would be willing to forgo cash in order to receive.  
a. NMI I: Duty Station of Choice 
The Navy homeports squadrons at various geographic regions in order to deploy 
throughout the world without the need to transit around major land masses. To determine 
whether duty station of choice provided any value to participants, this survey posed a 
series of questions to determine where an individual would want to be stationed and what 
was the value of that choice. The first survey question posed the following: “Please 
specify the location you would prefer to be stationed for your “Department Head Tour.” 
Possible answers were 1) Not applicable, 2) CONUS Central, 3) CONUS East Coast, 4) 
CONUS West Coast, and 5) OCONUS. For a few communities, there are no DH billets 
for certain geographic locations. As an example, VAQ squadrons are home ported out of 
NAS Whidbey Island, which is considered CONUS West Coast, and NAS Atsugi 
JAPAN, part of OCONUS. Participants were then asked “What is the equivalent cash 
bonus you would be willing to forgo for the guarantee of serving in your preferred duty 
station?” 
When asked concerning the location, 1,951 individuals out of 2,141 total 
responses provided a geographic partiality for serving their DH tour. Most preferred 
CONUS East (37.6%) or CONUS West (40.1%), which are the locations of most of the 
Navy’s aviation squadrons. Out of the 2,235 observations of interest, 1,187 indicated that 
they would wish to serve in their preferred duty station in exchange for some cash total. 
Table 25 details individual community preferences and the established values determined 
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for this particular NMI. For instance, 47 (or 52.2%) of the 90 VFA NFO observations 
indicated that forgoing some cash amount would be sufficient in return for the guarantee 
of serving at a geographic location of their choice. The average value for those VFA 
NFOs that wished to forgo cash for a desired geographic location was $62,660 while the 
median value was $50,000.  
 






b. NMI II: In-residence Graduate Education 
As noted in Chapter II, the typical career path for Navy aviators does not provide 
time or opportunity for in-residence graduate or post-graduate education. While Naval 
Aviation attaches importance to a master’s degree (Secretary of the Navy, 2015), the 
degree is valued but not expected. For any organization, investment in human capital 
demonstrates the value that knowledge management can produce for the individual and 
the organization (Mathis, Jackson, & Valentine, 2014). To determine the value 
individuals placed on participation in an in-residence graduate education opportunity 
prior to the DH tour, this study’s survey posed the following scenario: “Suppose the 
“Aviation Bonus” included the option to attend an in-residence degree program in lieu of 
some other “due-course” career path option (e.g., shortening or foregoing a 
“disassociated sea tour” to attend the Naval Postgraduate School). Assume that in 
addition to a cash bonus you were offered this option. How interested would you be in 
the in-residence degree portion of the bonus?” 
Possible responses included: 1) Not at all interested, 2) Indifferent/Don’t Know, 
3) Somewhat Interested, 4) Very Interested, and 5) Extremely Interested. Figure 11 
provides a graph of the percentages of the responses from the 2,316 responses. Nearly 
83% of the responses included some level of interest in participation in a graduate 
education. In addition to interest in the proposed in-residence participation, comments 
from respondents included desire to participate in graduate education programs at civilian 




Figure 11.  Interest in NMI II: In-residence Graduate Education 
In addition to evaluating interest in the graduate education program, we asked 
respondents “What is the equivalent cash bonus you would be willing to forgo for the 
guarantee of attending an in-residence degree program like the one described in the 
previous question?” Table 26 provides a summary of those values that individual placed 
on in-residence graduate education. As an example, 77 of the 123 VAW NFO 
observations (or 62.6%) indicated a value greater than $0 for graduate education. The 






























D. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE STAYING IN THE NAVY 
As part of the survey, respondents were asked how various factors influenced 
their decision to remain in the Navy. These factors included career progression and 
opportunities, operational tempo, earnings potential, and family dynamics. Answers 
ranged from significantly positive, in which the factor influenced their decision to stay 
in, to significantly negative, in which that factor decreased the likelihood they would 
stay or want to stay in the Navy. Results of these factors are found in Appendix E. 
We found that compensation such as healthcare, job stability, and 
pension/retirement benefits had significantly positive impact on participants’ decisions 
to stay in the Navy while factors such as operational tempo and impacts on family had 
negative impacts on people’s decisions to stay in the Navy. Career opportunities outside 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
After analyzing and cleaning the data from the surveys, seven models utilizing 
Microsoft Excel were conducted. Only bids from individuals who identified their parent 
community as a current, established Naval Aviation community were used. The first three 
models were variations of the simple uniform-price auction model. The first model 
included no restriction on bids of $175,000 and below, the second model imposed a 
restriction on the maximum bid, and the third model looked to correct for inconsistent 
bids. The fourth and fifth models are simulated QUAD auctions in which the quality 
threshold differs from one model to the other. The sixth and seventh models incorporated 
CRAM auctions in which geographic choice (sixth model) and in-residence graduate 
education (seventh model) were offered as non-monetary incentives (NMI). Repetitions 
of each of these models across all the current aviation communities were conducted. 
Using the results from these auctions, cost analyses and quality scoring were conducted 
while evaluating these auction mechanisms against the current FY-2013 system. 
A. GENERAL ANALYSIS 
In order to provide consistent assumptions with regard to the Kelso survey, FY-
2013 data regarding take-rates, costs, and retention requirements across the various 
communities was used as a baseline for analysis. To determine equivalent retention goals 
of the sample population, retention goal percentages were matched across the various 




Table 27.   FY-2013 ACCP Parameters and Retention Goals with 
Corresponding Sample Population Requirements (after Kelso, 2014) 
B. UNIFORM-PRICE AUCTION 
The uniform-price auction utilizes the reservation prices offered by the 
respondents from both this study’s survey and Kelso’s survey. After ranking these 
reservation prices in ascending order, the equivalent retention goal was used in order to 
determine how many corresponding bidders would be retained, starting with the lowest 
reservation price. The first excluded bid, *ib  for each community was established as the 
price for retaining an individual within that community. Equivalent total costs were 
determined by multiplying the cut-off bid by the actual retention goal required for the 
FY-2013 ACCP program.  Formally: 
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 * *Ai i iC b=   
where iC   equals equivalent total costs, 
*
ib  equals the cutoff bid from the auction, and iA  
equals the actual retention goal from FY-2013for each community, i.   
1. Results 
Table 28 demonstrates the cut-off bids and equivalent total costs associated with 
the simple uniform-price auction compared to the current set-price ACCP program. As an 
example, VAW NFOs established a cut-off bid of $75,000 per aviator but instead of 
retaining 35 NFOs under the FY-2013 system at a cost of $2,625,000 the uniform-price 
retains the retention goal of 18 VAW NFOs at an equivalent total cost of $1,350,000, 
saving $1,275,000 at a 48.57% cost savings. 
 
Table 28.   Cost Analysis of Uniform-Price Auction Model (after Kelso, 2014) 
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Under this auction mechanism, most communities that experienced over-retention 
(i.e., HSC, HSL/HSM, and VAW NFO) realized costs savings despite higher cut-off bids. 
Increases in other communities resulted from requirements to pay for additional aviators 
that were not met in the current FY-2013 method. The total cost per aviator for the 
uniform-price auction was determined by dividing the equivalent total costs for all 
communities by the total number of aviators retained. This resulted in a total cost of 
$105,045 per aviator. The total cost of $34,770,000 for the uniform price auction 
represented a 20.83% increase in overall cost compared to the current system. The 
auction retained 331 aviators and met 100% of both aggregate and individual community 
goals. 
In order to determine the cost per aviator from the current system, it was 
determined that the total costs per community would be divided by the number of 
individuals that the community either retained or wished to retain. Formally:  
Average Cost per Aviator (2013, corrected for over-retention) = 
 
For instance, while the HSC community paid $4,350,000 for 58 aviators, their retention 
goal was only 48 aviators. Therefore, the HSC community overspent for the 10 aviators. 
This amount, or seller’s surplus, represents the inefficiency in the system. Additionally, 
since the VAQ community only had four aviators take the bonus, the total cost was 
divided by the actual retention. By dividing the total cost of the program ($28,775,000) 
by the total number of aviators that Naval Aviation retained (if they did not meet goal) or 
wished to retain (if they exceeded goal), the total cost per aviator was $102,768. By 
utilizing the uniform price-auction, the total cost per aviator increased by $2,277 or 2.2% 





Each community achieved some measure of error between actual retention and 
retention goal with the current system. In order to determine the measure by which the 
uniform price auction improved on these errors, the absolute value of the difference 
between the actual retention and retention goal was divided by the retention goal to 
produce a percent error of each community’s retention goal. Formally, for each 
community: 
 
This percent error was totaled and divided by the number of categories to produce 
an average error of retention. For the current method, there is an average error 36.7% of 
retention while there is no average error for the simple uniform-price auction. Table 29 
illustrates the percent error for each community under both methods as well as the 





Table 29.   Percent Error Between Retention Goal and Actual Retention Under 








Table 30 imposes a reserve price of $125,000 to ensure that cut-off bids do not 
exceed current congressionally mandated maximum allocations. This reserve price 
affected three communities: VAQ pilot, VFA pilot, and VQ (T) pilot. While the cut-off 
bid lowers the equivalent cost for these communities, the cut-off bid change also forced 
retention of these communities to no longer match the retention goals of the community. 
The equivalent total cost of $33,320,000 represents a 15.79% increase over the current 
method. When total cost per aviator is corrected for over retention, the total cost per 
aviator for the uniform price auction allows for a $559 savings per aviator while retaining 
326 of the 331 aviators needed to meet retention goals across the different communities. 
Of note, none of the cut-off bids under this uniform price auction are lower than the 
current posted-price amount and yet, the Navy realizes cost savings when corrected for 
over retention. 
 
Table 30.   Cost Analysis of Uniform-Price Auction Model with a Reserve Price 
of $125,000 (after Kelso, 2014) 
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The average error for the current system remains 36.7% while this restricted 
uniform price auction incurs an average of 1.8% error of retention, as seen in Table 31. 
 
Table 31.   Percent Error Between Retention Goal and Actual Retention Under 
Current Method and Uniform Price with a Reserve Price of $125,000 
Table 32 represents the same uniform price auction format except correcting for 
individuals who submitted inconsistent bids by applying either their bid submitted or the 
amount of the individual’s contract, whichever was lower. The total cost of $30,560,000 
represents a 6.20% increase over the current cost of the FY-2013 ACCP program, due 
mainly to the fact that many communities had not met their retention goals. When 
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corrected for over retention, the total cost per aviator for this auction saved $10,442 per 
aviator and achieved an 11.3% cost savings. All retention goals were met by the uniform 
price auction and no community paid above the current congressionally mandated ACCP 
allocations. 
 
Table 32.   Cost Analysis of Uniform-Price Auction Model Correcting for 
Inconsistent Bidding (after Kelso, 2014) 
C. QUAD AUCTION MODEL I 
Under the QUAD model, discounts are applied to the reservation price of aviators 
for whom their quality score matches or exceeds a particular threshold. For the first 
QUAD model, aviators that rank within the top 10% of their respective category receive a 
$25,000 discount. After adjusting these bids, denoted as QUAD bids, all eligible QUAD 
bids are ranked in ascending order. The cost to retain an aviator within that community 
was established by utilizing the first excluded QUAD bid as the cut-of bid. In order to 
determine the average cost for each aviator in that community, we applied the QUAD 
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cutoff bid to each of the aviators retained in our sample population. If an aviator in our 
sample population met or exceeded the quality threshold, we gave an additional $25,000 
bonus. After summing the total bonus amount for all retained aviators, we divided this 
total cost by the number of individuals retained within the sample population.  The 
average cost for each aviator in that community was then applied to the retention goals 
from the FY-2013 system and the equivalent total cost was calculated.  
In order to calculate the effect of applying the QUAD auction to quality scores, 
we assessed the mean quality score for aviators retained under the QUAD auction and 
compared the results to the mean quality score for retained aviators under the uniform 
price auction. Since we did not have the performance metrics from the aviators who 
accepted the actual FY-2013 ACCP program, we could not compare quality scores from 
the current system to our auction mechanisms.  We additionally compared the equivalent 
total costs between the uniform and QUAD auction model to determine changes in total 
cost in order to compare against changes in quality score. 
1. Cost Comparison of QUAD I and Current Method 
Table 33 includes the costs of implementing the QUAD model I auction and the 
current FY-2013 ACCP program. As an example, VFA NFOs received a posted price of 
$25,000 for the FY-2013 program but only 5 of the 14 NFOs from that community’s 
retention goal took the ACCP contract. Under the QUAD model, that community 
established $90,000 as the cut-off bid. By applying a $25,000 bonus to a proportionate 
number of aviators from the sample population, the mean individual cost was $99,211 for 
an equivalent total cost of $1,388,947 to retain all 14 VFA NFOs that the Navy expected 
to receive from the ACCP contract. 
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Table 33.   Cost Analysis of QUAD Auction Model I (after Kelso, 2014)  
For the VAQ pilots, VAW/VRC pilots, VFA pilots, and VQ (T) pilots, the cut-off 
bid either exceeded or met the current legislative maximum of $125,000; this meant that 
for aviators in those communities that met the quality threshold, the total amount would 
exceed the legislative maximum.  
The total equivalent cost for the QUAD auction outpaced the current method by 
$7,047,170 or near 25% in additional costs. When calculating the costs per aviator and 
factoring in correction for over retention, however, costs for the QUAD model aviator 
exceeded the current method by $5,456 per aviator or 5.0% in additional costs.  
While costs did not decrease for this QUAD model, retention error decreased for 
each community and for all naval aviation. Utilizing the retention error method from the 
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uniform price auction, the Navy experienced a 36.7% error rate for retention on average 
while the QUAD model included no error on retention rates. 
2. Cost and Quality Comparison between QUAD I and Uniform Price 
Auction  
Table 34 lists the average quality scores for the aviators retained under the 
uniform-price model and the QUAD model I auction. All of the categories demonstrated 
increases in the quality score except for the VAQ pilot, VQ(P) pilot, and HM categories. 
These three categories had equivalent quality scores for both the uniform and QUAD 
auctions. Most of these increases in quality score required additional costs compared to 
the uniform price auction.  
Overall, the QUAD model I auction required $1,052,170 more than the uniform 
price auction with an additional increase of 0.42 in quality score across all of the 
categories. This increase represents the difference between an aviator who has completed 
a warfare transition and the aviator who began their career within Naval Aviation and has 
remained within the traditional career progression. Increases in quality scores ranged 
from 0 (VAQ pilot) to 1.36 points (VP NFO). 
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Table 34.   Uniform-Price and QUAD Model I Cost and Quality Comparison 
(after Kelso, 2014) 
D. QUAD AUCTION MODEL II 
For the second QUAD model, aviators that rank within the top 25% of their 
respective category receive a $25,000 discount. The format and procedures are the same 
as the first QUAD model.  
1. Cost Comparison of QUAD I and Current Method 
Table 35 includes the costs of implementing the QUAD model II auction and the 
current FY-2013 ACCP program. As an example, VAW/VRC pilots received a posted 
price of $100,000 for the FY-2013 program but only 16 of the 18 pilots from that 
community’s retention goal took the ACCP contract. Under the QUAD model, that 
community established $100,000 as the cut-off bid. When factoring in the additional 
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$25,000 for aviators that met the quality threshold, the mean individual cost was 
$109,184 for an equivalent total cost of $1,965,306 to retain all 18 VAW/VRC pilots that 
the Navy had anticipated to receive the ACCP contract. 
 
Table 35.   Cost Analysis of QUAD Auction Model II 
Again, for the VAQ pilots, VAW/VRC pilots, VFA pilots, and VQ (T) pilots, the 
cut-off bid either exceeded or met the current legislative maximum of $125,000, which 
meant that for aviators in those communities that met the quality threshold, the total 
amount would exceed the legislative maximum.  
The total equivalent cost for the QUAD auction required $6,397,949 more than 
the current method or near 22.2% in additional costs. However, when calculating the 
costs per aviator and factoring in correction for over retention, costs for the QUAD model 
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aviator exceeded the current method by $3,495 per aviator or 5.0% in additional costs per 
aviator.  
While costs did not decrease for this QUAD model, retention error decreased for 
each community and for all naval aviation. Utilizing the retention error method from the 
uniform price auction, the Navy experienced a 36.7% error rate for retention on average 
while, again, the QUAD model included no error on retention rates. 
2. Cost and Quality Comparison between QUAD II and Uniform Price 
Auction  
Table 36 lists the average quality scores for the aviators retained under the 
uniform-price model and the QUAD model II auction. All of the categories demonstrated 
increases in the quality score and for most of NFO categories, there was a concurrent 
increase in total costs. However, many of the pilot categories realized cost savings 
compared to the uniform-price model. 
Overall, the QUAD model II auction experienced an increase of 0.82 points in 
quality score across all of the categories but cost $402,949 more than the uniform-price 
auction. This quality increase of nearly 1 point would be the equivalent between the 
number 2 or 3 aviator in the squadron and the number 1 aviator. Increases in quality 
scores ranged from limited increases of 0.17 (VP pilot) to 1.93 points (VFA NFO), or the 




Table 36.   Uniform-Price and QUAD Model II Cost and Quality Comparison 
E. CRAM MODEL USING NMI I 
Individual respondents were offered the opportunity to choose their geographic 
duty station for their DH tour and were asked how much cash they would be willing to 
forgo from the ACCP bonus to receive this non-monetary incentive. Aviators who 
offered NMI bids in excess of $15,000 for receiving this NMI were identified. Their 
CRAM bids were computed in the following manner. We subtracted the value of the 
NMI from the original cash bid, and added the cost of the NMI to the cash bid to create 
the CRAM bid. The cost of $15,000 for geographic choice stemmed the costs of a 
permanent change of station (PCS) move (Kelso, 2014). No opportunity costs or force 
management/personnel costs were included for this policy. For an example, if an aviator 
valued geographic selection at $25,000, their initial ACCP bid would be reduced by 
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$10,000 ($25,000 minus the $15,000 cost) and this would be their CRAM bid. When 
CRAM bids matched, aviators’ bids were randomly accepted. The CRAM model was 
conducted in a similar fashion to the uniform-price model. The CRAM cutoff bid was 
determined by utilizing the first excluded bid of the sample population. Equivalent costs 
of implementing this CRAM auction were calculated by multiplying the FY-2013 
retention goal numbers by the cut-off CRAM bid. 
1. Results 
Table 37 illustrates the costs of implementing a CRAM auction utilizing 
geographic selection as an NMI. The cut-off CRAM bid represents the cost that the Navy 
incurs in order to maintain officers for the additional five years of service under the 
CRAM model, which includes the cash amount and the cost of the NMI if the aviator 
selected the NMI. For example, the cut-off bid for HSC pilots was $65,000 which was 
$10,000 less than the current FY-2013 method price of $75,000. If the aviator had 
indicated that they were interested in receiving the NMI, the aviator would receive 
$65,000 minus the cost of the NMI of $15,000, and would therefore receive $50,000 in 
total cash as well as the guarantee of the geographic region for their DH tour.  
By utilizing the percentage of individuals in our sample that met the cut-off bid 
within each community and selected the NMI option, we were able to determine the 
expected split of total cash costs and total NMI costs per community. For example, the 
total cost among the VP pilot community of using the CRAM model utilizing NM I was 
$2,480,000; however, $249,851 of that total was spent on PCS moves. 
When comparing the comparing equivalent total costs, the CRAM auction 
required $195,000 less in costs than the current FY-2013 system. When correcting for 
over retention, the total cost per aviator for the CRAM auction was only $86,344, 
compared to $102,768 per aviator under the current system. This represents $16,423 in 
costs savings per targeted aviator and represents no errors in meeting retention goals. 
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Table 37.   CRAM Model (NMI I) Cost Analysis (after Kelso, 2014) 
F. CRAM MODEL USING NMI II 
In this CRAM model, we conducted the same auction as the previous model. 
However, instead of using geographic choice as our NMI, individual respondents were 
offered the opportunity to attend an in-residence graduate degree program in lieu of a 
disassociated sea tour. They were then asked how much cash they would be willing to 
forgo from the ACCP bonus to receive this non-monetary incentive. Aviators who 
offered NMI bids in excess of $45,000 for receiving this NMI were identified and 
received a discount from their initial ACCP bid equal to this stated amount minus the 
$45,000 cost that the Navy would pay to offer and provide this NMI. The cost of $45,000 
for graduate education stemmed from a PCS move and costs to the Navy equal to the 
officer attending NPS for six quarters at $4,850 per quarter. Similarly to Kelso’s research, 




Table 38 illustrates the costs of implementing a CRAM auction utilizing in-
residence graduation education as an NMI. The cut-off bid represents the cost that the 
Navy incurs in order to maintain officers for the additional five years of service under the 
CRAM model, which includes the cash amount and the cost of the NMI if the aviator 
selected the NMI. For example, the cut-off bid for HM pilots was $90,000 which was 
$15,000 greater than the current FY-2013 method price of $75,000. If the aviator had 
indicated that they were interested in receiving the NMI, the aviator would receive 
$90,000 minus the cost of the NMI of $45,000, and would therefore receive $45,000 in 
total cash as well as the guarantee of attending an in-residence program.  
By utilizing the percentage of individuals that met the cut-off bid within each 
community and selected the NMI option, we were able to determine the expected split of 
total cash costs and total NMI costs per community. For example, the total cost among 
the VAQ NFO community of using the CRAM model utilizing NM II was $1,615,000; 
however, $327,857 of that total was spent on in-residence graduate education program 
expenses, including tuition and PCS moves. 
When comparing the comparing equivalent total costs, the CRAM auction 
required $3,305,000 more in costs than the current FY-2013 system. However, when 
correcting for over retention, the total cost per aviator for the CRAM auction was only 
$96,918, compared to $102,768 per aviator under the current system. This represents 





Table 38.   Cost Analysis of CRAM Auction Model (NMI II) (after Kelso, 
2014) 
G. SUMMARY OF MODEL PERFORMANCE 
Each of the models was able to accomplish the retention goals for which the 
various auction mechanisms were designed. The Uniform Price auction met retention 
goals for models 1 and 3 and model 2 decreased retention errors from 36.7% to almost 
1% across the communities. The QUAD auction demonstrated increased quality scores 
for individuals that the Navy wished to retain. The CRAM models provided an 
opportunity to decrease costs from both the current system and the uniform price while 
providing non-monetary incentives that provide opportunities for aviators to decide on 
various compensation packages. 
A summary of the characteristics of the QUAD and CRAM models compared to 
the simple Uniform Price auction can be found in Table 39. Both QUAD models 
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provided greater quality scores compared to the uniform price auction but at the expense 
of additional costs. Both CRAM models resulted in significant savings compared to the 
uniform price auction model, especially when utilizing the first NMI of geographic 
selection. This model provides both costs savings and retention goal matching for all 
communities and across all naval aviation. If utilizing both NMIs as part of the model, it 
is possible to realize more cost savings. However, we only utilized one NMI per model.  
 
Table 39.   Improvements of QUAD and CRAM over Uniform Price 
The average cost per aviator when corrected for over retention is summarized in 
Table 40.  
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Table 40.   Average Cost Per Aviator when Corrected for Over Retention 





VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this research was to determine the potential improvements of 
applying uniform-price auction, Quality Adjusted Discount, and Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism compensation programs to replace the current bonus system that 
provides monetary incentives for naval aviators to serve beyond their initial obligation. 
Incorporating the survey results of 2,316 naval aviators and Naval Flight Offices across 
the various Navy Aviation Enterprise (NAE) communities, we analyzed the impact that 
auction mechanisms would have on quantity, quality, and cost for retained Naval 
Aviators. Using quality metrics derived from previous DH selection boards and auction 
bids from survey respondents, we developed individual quality scores and reservation 
prices. We then ran multiple iterations of the three auction mechanisms to determine 
winning bids by utilizing the retention goals and costs of the FY-2013 ACCP program. 
We then compared these costs and results against the results of the current FY-2013 
ACCP program. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Our research showed that the changes to the current ACCP program could include 
improvements in cost, quality, and particularly quantity of aviators that would be eligible 
for the Aviation Department Head Screen Board. These results support previous findings 
on auctions as force management compensation mechanisms (Nowell, 2012; Kelso, 
2014).  
1. Primary Research Questions 
a. What alternative methods can be used for administering the Aviation 
Career Continuation Pay (ACCP)? 
The current ACCP program utilizes a posted-price auction in which individuals 
decide to receive the bonus offered from the Navy. Alternative mechanisms include a 
uniform-price auction that incorporates a sealed-bid, second-price reverse auction as well 
as a Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD) auction that provides a monetary discount for 
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attaining a quality threshold and a Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) 
that incorporates non-monetary incentives as part of the compensation package. 
b. What, approximately, is the market clearing price for the Aviation 
Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) in order to retain the correct number 
and quality of officer among the various Type / Model / Series? 
Utilizing the simple uniform-price auction, we found that the total cost of 
$34,770,000 or an increase of 20.8% in costs to meet all the community goals, resulting 
in a cost of $105,045 per aviator. When capped to the congressional limits of $125,000, 
the total cost per aviator decreased to $102,209 while incurring an average of 1.8% error 
in retention. We found that many of the participants that had already received an ACCP 
contract submitted inconsistent bids. The amount of the ACCP contract they received 
represented the minimum amount they would accept to serve an additional 5-year 
contract since they would have not agreed to the service if the amount was not high 
enough. If, when asked for their bid, contract amount was less than their bid, we 
considered this an inconsistent bid. We found that 42% of the individuals who received 
an ACCP contract submitted inconsistent bids (Table 16). Lastly, when we corrected for 
the inconsistent bidding, we found that the total cost decreased to $30,560,000 or a total 
cost of $92,326 per aviator. When comparing this cost to the current system, corrected for 
over retention, this cost represents 11.3% in cost savings. 
When we incorporated quality scores and discounts into the two QUAD models, 
we found that both met or increased quality scores among the individuals receiving the 
bonus. For the first model, in which we applied a $25,000 discount to the top 10% of 
aviators in each category, total equivalent costs increased by $1,052,170 or 3.0%, while 
quality scores increased by 5.9% when compared to the simple uniform-price auction. 
The total cost per aviator resulted in $108,224 or an increase of 5.0% compared to the 
current system corrected for over retention. This does not represent a significant 
difference in the quality score which why we recommend utilizing the second model. 
Utilizing the second model, in which a $25,000 discount was applied to the top 25% of 
each community, total cost per aviator decreased slightly from the first QUAD model. 
This QUAD model retained the correct number of aviators at a cost of $106,262 or an 
increase of $402,949 compared to the uniform-price cost. The increase of quality score 
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by 0.82 points between the uniform-price and QUAD II model represents retaining the 
number one EP aviator in the squadron compared to the number 3 EP aviator in the 
squadron. 
When we incorporate the first NMI of geographic choice, we found that the 
correct price for the average aviator decreased to $86,344 and that the cost was split 
between cash allocations and non-monetary incentives. If we incorporate the other NMI 
of in-residence graduate education, the average cost rose to $96, 918 which is still nearly 
$6,000 less than the average cost per aviator when corrected for over retention. Finally, 
although not analyzed in our study, allowing for choices of two NMI would further 
decrease cost. 
What are the appropriate metrics for deciding the quality of officers among naval 
aviation in order to maintain high quality for retention? 
While we did provide some quality factors that allowed us to calculate individual 
quality scores, these quality factors seemed to indicate no statistically significant 
correlation between ACCP bids and total quality score. We used factors that were 
identified by Aviation Department Head Screen Board lessons learned as characteristics 
that factored into improved selection rates.  
These factors match the Navy aviation community values in general, but 
individual communities or categories may focus their weights on different areas. For 
instance, fixed wing shore based squadrons may value disassociated shore tours as part of 
the ship’s company to provide opportunities for pilots and NFOs to experience diverse 
deployment and operational environments. 
What efficiency gain and loss can we expect with a market-based compensation? 
All the auction mechanisms have the capability of meeting the quantity demand 
from the retention goals from each community. Errors in take-rates across communities 
may average nearly 38% under the current system while this error decreases to zero for 
auction mechanisms researched. Costs savings per aviator were achieved when applying 
a constrained uniform-price auction or when applying CRAM utilizing either non-
monetary incentive.  
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When applying the auction mechanisms, additional resources are needed in order 
to either screen applicants for quality scores under the QUAD mechanism or 
incorporating non-monetary incentives under CRAM. The current system already has the 
needed infrastructure to continue to provide bonuses to aviators. Changes to the current 
system require strategic change management as well as providing education among the 
stakeholders, bonus applicants, and administrative entities needed to run the auction 
system. 
One of the limitations of this thesis is that the survey was voluntary and only 
those interested or able to respond provided feedback. When only a certain population is 
able to answer the questions to a survey, selection bias may be introduced into the results. 
While the survey was offered to naval aviators for which we had contact information, 
only 22% of the respondents provided complete answers for the survey.  
Utilizing surveys as a collection of data does not offer the ability to provide 
follow-up guidance or questions based on respondent’s feedback and therefore, the data 
is static and only covers the individuals who responded to the survey. Additionally, the 
data obtained from a survey could not be matched to individual officer data files so that 
career evaluation data was based on self-reporting information.  
Another limitation of this thesis is that the results were only compared to a 
singular year of the ACCP program, FY-2013. While this thesis does cover some of the 
more recent ACCP programs, take-rates and retention goals change each year and 
inefficiencies within the ACCP program vary each year. This thesis does not cover the 
FY-2014 program take rates or bonus amounts; individuals who may have received the 
bonus may have based their answers on the most current bonus amounts in determining 
their reservation values. 
Another limitation of this thesis is that the bids offered submitted by aviators were 
not tied to consequences. In most auctions, bidding too high in a forward auction may 
result in the “winner’s curse” while bidding too high in a reverse auction will prevent the 
individual from winning the amount. Since the amount bid was not actually going to be 
received by participants, individuals may not have submitted bids congruent with the bids 
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they would offer in an auction for which they are eligible. This research included 
individual aviators who already received the ACCP bonus and therefore had limited 
utility in providing low bids. Since the description of the auction was only offered in 
writing on the survey, understanding of the auction format was measured only by self-
reporting by individuals who responded. 
2. Secondary Research Question 
• What factors influence preferences of staying in the Navy? 
Among the comments in our survey, we found that the auction mechanisms 
described in the survey were not well received by all participants. Individuals found the 
concept of an auction incongruent with the idea of good order and discipline. They 
indicated that money and compensation weren’t the only factors that would keep them in 
the Navy but factors such as comradery and patriotism are also important. 
However, we found that monetary compensation can be a large factor in their 
decision to stay in the Navy. This may stem from the larger retirement packages available 
but it does indicate that economic factors may continue to greatly influence officers’ 
decisions to remain in the active duty. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Extensive research has been conducted on the use of auction mechanisms within 
the military (Kelso, 2014; Nowell, 2012; White, 2010; Verenna, 2007). However, 
additional research into experimental studies regarding the bidding process of Navy 
aviators may validate the understanding of the auction mechanisms as well as the bids 
submitted by the individuals in this survey. Some of the issues that were not addressed by 
our survey were individuals’ reasons for not taking the bonus when they were eligible or 
deciding to not be retained under the notional auction system. Whether the decision was 
due to the amount offered or career choices would allow policy makers the opportunity to 
lobby for greater amounts or advocate for viable alternate career paths. 
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While we developed some quality metrics for the quality score and QUAD 
auction, further research into individual performance traits and their weights would 
provide guidance for determining quality score cutoffs for discounts in the QUAD 
auction. Additionally, by codifying the values that each community regards as core to 
their mission, selection boards would be better prepared to select the best qualified 
aviators for future assignment in the community.  
Another issue revolves around the current career progression. Many respondents 
found little value in the requirement of the typical disassociated sea tour. Being removed 
from the cockpit decreased airmanship skills in which the Navy has heavily invested. 
Many of the respondents offered favorable interest in an in-residence graduate education 
program. However, they countered this enthusiasm with the knowledge that the Not 
Observed FITREP would decrease their chance of selection for career milestones. Other 
survey respondents offered the idea of researching career progression that doesn’t require 
promotion to LCDR or DH, but rather the career opportunity to fly in operational tours 
for multiple tours. 
Future surveys may benefit from utilizing a single database. When drafting the 
survey, we were able to implement previous questions from prior research. However, 
results from those surveys were not made available to us in order to see whether auction 
mechanisms in other communities would impact our research. Further survey research 




As seen in Table 41, the current ACCP system fails to meet needed quantity 
within each community, provides no means to determine quality of officers that receive 
the ACCP bonus, and offers no non-monetary incentives. Applying uniform-price 
auctions addresses the quantity requirements for each community while adding some cost 
controls by ensuring that costs are not being applied to over retention. Applying a QUAD 
auction adds quality scores and the opportunity to increase quality scores among the 
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aviators retained. Utilizing the CRAM model, non-monetary incentives are offered to 
aviators. While we did not conduct research into combining QUAD and CRAM auctions, 
these auctions have the opportunity to meet both quality scoring and NMIs in addition to 
cost savings while meeting retention goals. 
 
Table 41.   Comparison of Current ACCP system to Uniform-Price Auction, 
QUAD auction, and CRAM auction  
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APPENDIX A.  VALUES, CAREER PATH, AND MILESTONES FOR 
AVIATION OFFICERS 
Naval Personnel Command provides community briefs for administrative and 
statutory boards to inform members of the values, expected career path, and milestones. 
The following represents the community values and career progression among the Naval 
Aviation Community. 
 121 
1. Aviation Officer Community Values 
 
Figure 12.  Aviation Officer Community Values (from NPC, n.d.a) 
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2. Aviation Officer Career Progression  
 
Figure 13.  Aviation Officer Career Path (from NPC, n.d.a) 
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APPENDIX B.  NAVAL AVIATOR FLIGHT TRAINING 
PROGRESSION 
 
Figure 14.  SNA Flight Training Selection Tree (from CNATRA, n.d.a) 
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Figure 15.  SNFO Flight Training Selection Tree (from CNATRA, n.d.c) 
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APPENDIX C.  SUMMARY OF PAST ACCP PERFORMANCE 
 


















Figure 18.  Fiscal Year 2013 ACCP Performance Summary 
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APPENDIX D.  COPY OF SURVEY 
Market-Based Approach to Aviator 
Retention 
The purpose of this research survey is to assess the possibilities for improving the current 
aviator retention program. 
This survey has 45 questions. Depending on your individual aviation career, you may or 
may not be asked some of the questions. Estimated completion time is 15 minutes. 
There are 45 questions in this survey. 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATING IN 
THIS RESEARCH SURVEY 
Your participation in this survey is strictly voluntary. The data collected will NOT 
become part of your permanent record and will NOT affect your career in anyway. If you 
do not choose to participate in this survey, you may decline to answer any questions and 
are free to withdraw from taking the survey at any time. 
Any data provided will be maintained according to DOD policy. Be assured that any 
information you provide will be used responsibly and protected from unauthorized 
access; however, as with any data collection process there is a minor risk that the 
information collected could be inappropriately disclosed. 
If you have any questions regarding this research, contact Dr. Noah Myung at 
noah.myung@nps.edu or 831-656-2811; alternatively, contact LCDR Brett Williams at 
bwilliam@nps.edu. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, 
please contact the NPS Institutional Review Board Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, at 
lgshattu@nps.edu or 831-656-2473. 
[]I have read the informed consent document. I understand that, before 
taking this survey, I may ask questions and have them answered to my 
satisfaction. I further understand that by selecting "Yes" below, I agree to 
participate in this research, and I do not waive any of my legal rights. * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Yes  
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• No  
If you wish to retain a copy of this statement for your personal records, please print this 
screen.  
AVIATION CAREER CONTINUATION PAY (ACCP) 
ACCP is also referred to as the "Aviation Bonus" or "Department Head Retention 
Bonus." ACCP is offered as an incentive to all eligible aviators who, in exchange for a 
cash bonus, agree to remain on active duty beyond their Minimum Service Requirement 
and complete an Aviation "Department Head Tour." The following table lists the most 






HM $75,000 N/A 
HSC $75,000 N/A 
HSL/HSM $75,000 N/A 
VAQ $125,000 $100,000 
VAW/VRC $125,000 $75,000 
VFA $125,000 $75,000 
VP $75,000 $75,000 
VQ(P) $75,000 $50,000 
VQ(T) $75,000 $100,000 
 []Have you accepted or submitted an ACCP contract? * 
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was 'Yes' at 
question '1 [Q1]' (I have read the informed consent document. I understand that before 
taking this survey, I may ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. I 
further understand that by selecting "Yes" below, I agree to participate in this research, 
and I do not waive any of my legal rights). 
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Yes  
• No  
[]What was the total amount for your ACCP contract?  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was 'Yes' at 
question '2 [Q2]' (Have you accepted or submitted an ACCP contract?). 
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Please choose only one of the following: 
• $25,000  
• $50,000  
• $75,000  
• $100,000  
• $125,000  
• Other  
  
[]How much of an effect does/did ACCP have on your decision to stay in 
the Navy?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• No effect at all  
• Very little effect  
• Somewhat effected  
• Effected very much  
[]Assuming the ACCP bonus for your community were to remain the same 
as listed above, how likely would you be to accept the bonus?  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was 'No' at 
question '2 [Q2]' (Have you accepted or submitted an ACCP contract?). 
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Very Unlikely (Less than a 15% chance of accepting the bonus)  
• Unlikely (Between 15% and 30% chance of accepting the bonus)  
• Somewhat Unlikely (Between 30% and 45% chance of accepting the bonus)  
• Neutral/Uncertain (Between 45% and 55% chance of accepting the bonus)  
• Somewhat Likely (Between 55% and 70% chance of accepting the bonus)  
• Likely (Between 70% and 85% chance of accepting the bonus)  
• Very Likely (More than an 85% chance of accepting the bonus)  
[]How likely would you be to accept the bonus and agree to complete a 
"Department Head Tour" if the following TOTAL bonus amounts were 
offered to you (percentages reflect probability of ACCEPTING the 
bonus)?  


























       
$25,000 
       
$50,000 
       
$75,000 
       
$100,000 
       
$125,000 
       
$150,000 
       
$175,000 
       
[]Please state how much you AGREE with the following statements about 
the "Aviation Bonus" program: 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 



















       











       
Prior to 
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in the same 
community. 
       
[]Please provide any additional comments in regard to questions in this 
section:  
Please write your answer here: 
 
MARKET-BASED RETENTION SYSTEM 
Suppose the Navy replaces the current ACCP program with one that uses an auction-
based system to determine the bonus amount for a specified number of contracts. 
This auction-based format would work in the following manner: Suppose there are 100 
aviators eligible to receive retention bonuses, and the Navy announces it will seek to 
retain 60 of those aviators. Each aviator would individually and privately submit a bid 
with the minimum bonus amount he or she would be willing to accept in exchange for 
agreeing to complete a "Department Head Tour." 
The Navy would compile all the bids and award the bonuses to the 60 aviators with the 
lowest bid, but it would pay each of them the amount listed in the 61st lowest bid (e.g., if 
the 61st lowest bid was $75,000, then the 60 winning aviators would each receive 
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$75,000, even though each had agreed to accept a lower amount). The remaining aviators 
would not receive bonuses and would not be obligated to serve a "Department Head 
Tour." 
This auction format is designed so that it is in the bidder's best interest to bid truthfully. 
That is, there is no incentive to "game" the system by overbidding or underbidding. 
[]Assume you are in a group of 140 aviators eligible to receive a retention 
bonus. If, under the system described above, the Navy's goal is to retain 65 
aviators, what is the amount you would likely submit for your bid 
(TOTAL bonus amount)?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• $0/ No Bonus Required  
• $5,000  
• $10,000  
• $15,000  
• $20,000  
• $25,000  
• $30,000  
• $35,000  
• $40,000  
• $45,000  
• $50,000  
• $55,000  
• $60,000  
• $65,000  
• $70,000  
• $75,000  
• $80,000  
• $85,000  
• $90,000  
• $95,000  
• $100,000  
• $105,000  
• $110,000  
• $115,000  
• $120,000  
• $125,000  
• $130,000  
• $135,000  
• $140,000  
• $145,000  
• $150,000  
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• $155,000  
• $160,000  
• $165,000  
• $170,000  
• $175,000  
• More than $175,000 / Do not wish to be retained  
• Other  
Note: This value should be the MINIMUM amount you would be satisfied with in 
exchange for obligating to serve a DH tour.  
[]Rank the methods by which how you would determine your ACCP bid:  
All your answers must be different. 
 
Please number each box in order of preference from 1 to 4: 
□Utilize the winning bid from the previous year  
□Discuss amount with aviators in my community  
□Evaluate my potential earnings from employment outside of the Navy  
□Other  
[]How well do you feel you understand the auction-based system described 
above (e.g., who is retained, how bonus amount is determined, how you 
should bid)?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Clearly Understand  
• Sufficiently Understand  
• Somewhat Understand  
• Do Not Understand  
[]Please specify the location you would prefer to be stationed for your 
"Department Head Tour:"  
Please choose only one of the following: 
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• Not Applicable  
• CONUS Central  
• CONUS East Coast  
• CONUS West Coast  
• OCONUS  
[]What is the equivalent cash bonus you would be willing to forgo for the 
guarantee of serving in your preferred duty station?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• $0  
• $5,000  
• $10,000  
• $15,000  
• $20,000  
• $25,000  
• $30,000  
• $35,000  
• $40,000  
• $45,000  
• $50,000  
• $55,000  
• $60,000  
• $65,000  
• $70,000  
• $75,000  
• $80,000  
• $85,000  
• $90,000  
• $95,000  
• $100,000  
• $105,000  
• $110,000  
• $115,000  
• $120,000  
• $125,000  
• $130,000  
• $135,000  
• $140,000  
• $145,000  
• $150,000  
• $155,000  
• $160,000  
• $165,000  
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• $170,000  
• $175,000  
• More than $175,000  
• Other  
[]Suppose the "Aviation Bonus" included the option to attend an in-
residence degree program in lieu of some other "due-course" career path 
option (e.g., shortening or foregoing a "Disassociated Sea Tour" to attend 
the Naval Postgraduate School). Assume that in addition to a cash bonus 
you were offered this option. How interested would you be in the in-
residence degree portion of the bonus?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Not At All Interested  
• Indifferent / Do Not Know  
• Somewhat Interested  
• Very Interested  
• Extremely Interested  
[]What is the equivalent cash bonus you would be willing to forgo for the 
guarantee of attending an in-residence degree program like the one 
described in the previous question?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• $0  
• $5,000  
• $10,000  
• $15,000  
• $20,000  
• $25,000  
• $30,000  
• $35,000  
• $40,000  
• $45,000  
• $50,000  
• $55,000  
• $60,000  
• $65,000  
• $70,000  
• $75,000  
• $80,000  
• $85,000  
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• $90,000  
• $95,000  
• $100,000  
• $105,000  
• $110,000  
• $115,000  
• $120,000  
• $125,000  
• $130,000  
• $135,000  
• $140,000  
• $145,000  
• $150,000  
• $155,000  
• $160,000  
• $165,000  
• $170,000  
• $175,000  
• More than $175,000  
• Other  
[]In addition to the two options listed in the questions above, is there any 
other non-monetary incentive that might increase your willingness to stay 
in the Navy after completing your initial service obligation?  
Please write your answer here: 
  
[]What is the equivalent cash bonus you would be willing to forgo for the 
guarantee of the option you listed above?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• $0  
• $5,000  
• $10,000  
• $15,000  
• $20,000  
• $25,000  
• $30,000  
• $35,000  
• $40,000  
• $45,000  
• $50,000  
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• $55,000  
• $60,000  
• $65,000  
• $70,000  
• $75,000  
• $80,000  
• $85,000  
• $90,000  
• $95,000  
• $100,000  
• $105,000  
• $110,000  
• $115,000  
• $120,000  
• $125,000  
• $130,000  
• $135,000  
• $140,000  
• $145,000  
• $150,000  
• $155,000  
• $160,000  
• $165,000  
• $170,000  
• $175,000  
• More than $175,000  
• Other  
[]Please provide any additional comments in regard to questions in this 
section:  
Please write your answer here: 
  
CAREER SATISFACTION 
Please answer the following questions based on your PERSONAL experience / opinion:  
[]Use the following scale to answer how the factors below affect/affected 
your decision to STAY on Active Duty and serve a Department Head 
Tour:  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 141 
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Current Job 




       
Duty Station 
Location        
Time Away 
From Home        
Geographic 

















       
Patriotism/ 
Camaraderie        
Amount of 
Flight Time        
Education/ 
Training 
Offered by the 
Navy 




       
Monthly Pay & 
Compensation        
 142 












ment Plan        
Job Security 
       
Healthcare 
       
[]Please provide any additional comments in regard to questions in this 
section:  
Please write your answer here: 
  
FIRST SEA TOUR 
The following questions are in regard to your "FIRST SEA TOUR" (i.e., your first 
operational fleet squadron):  
[]What is your parent aviation community?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• HM  
• HSC/HS  
• HSM/HSL  
• VAQ  
• VAW  
• VFA  
• VP  
• VQ(P)  
• VQ(T)  
• VRC  
• Other  
[]Where were you stationed/home-ported for your "First SEA Tour?"  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Not Applicable  
• CONUS Central  
• CONUS East Coast  
 143 
• CONUS West Coast  
• OCONUS  
• Other  
[]What was your ranking on your final competitive FITREP during your 
"First SEA Tour?"  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was NOT 'Not 
Applicable' at question '22 [Q21]' (Where were you stationed/home-ported for your "First 
SEA Tour?"). 
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Not Applicable  
• #1 EP  
• #2 or greater EP/unnumbered EP  
• #1 MP  
• #2 or greater MP/unnumbered MP  
A "competitive" FITREP is any FITREP with a summary group of more than "1" 
(Typically a Periodic or Detachment of Reporting Senior report and not a Detachment of 
Individual report).  
FIRST SHORE TOUR 
The following questions are in regard to your "FIRST SHORE TOUR" (i.e., the 
command you were assigned to immediately following your "First SEA Tour"). 
[]What type of command did you serve in for your "First SHORE Tour?"  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Not Applicable  
• EWTG  
• Flag Aide  
• Fleet Replacement Squadron  
• GSA/IA  
• HT Squadron  
• HX Squadron  
• Naval Safety Center  
• NPC  
• NPS  
• NSAWC  
• OLA  
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• ONI  
• PEP  
• PMRF  
• ROTC  
• Staff, Base  
• Staff, Flag  
• Staff, Wing  
• Station SAR  
• USNA  
• VFC  
• VT Squadron  
• Weapons School  
• Other  
[]Where were you stationed/home-ported?  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was NOT 'Not 
Applicable' at question '24 [Q23]' (What type of command did you serve in for your 
"First SHORE Tour?"). 
Please choose only one of the following: 
• CONUS Central  
• CONUS East Coast  
• CONUS West Coast  
• OCONUS  
• Other  
[]What was your ranking on your final competitive FITREP during your 
"First SHORE Tour?"  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was NOT 'Not 
Applicable' at question '24 [Q23]' (What type of command did you serve in for your 
"First SHORE Tour?"). 
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Not Applicable  
• #1 EP  
• #2 or greater EP/unnumbered EP  
• #1 MP  
• #2 or greater MP/unnumbered MP  
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A "competitive" FITREP is any FITREP with a summary group of more than "1" 
(Typically a Periodic or Detachment of Reporting Senior report and not a Detachment of 
Individual report).  
SECOND SEA TOUR 
The following questions are in regard to your "SECOND SEA TOUR" (i.e., 
Disassociated Sea Tour):  
[]What position did you hold during your "Second SEA Tour?"  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Not Applicable  
• Amphib, Ship's Company  
• CVN, Ship's Company  
• Squadron Tactics / Training Officer  
• Staff, CVW  
• Staff, DESRON  
• Staff, Fleet  
• Staff, PHIBRON  
• Super JO  
• Other  
[]Where were you stationed / home-ported?  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was NOT 'Not 
Applicable' at question '27 [Q26]' (What position did you hold during your "Second SEA 
Tour?"). 
Please choose only one of the following: 
• CONUS Central  
• CONUS East Coast  
• CONUS West Coast  
• OCONUS  
• Other  
[]What was your ranking on your final competitive FITREP during your 
"Second SEA Tour?"  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was NOT 'Not 
Applicable' at question '27 [Q26]' (What position did you hold during your "Second SEA 
Tour?”). 
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Please choose only one of the following: 
• Not Applicable  
• #1 EP  
• #2 or greater EP/unnumbered EP  
• #1 MP  
• #2 or greater MP/unnumbered MP  
A "competitive" FITREP is any FITREP with a summary group of more than "1" 
(Typically a Periodic or Detachment of Reporting Senior report and not a Detachment of 
Individual report).  
DEPARTMENT HEAD TOUR 
The following questions are in regard to your squadron "DEPARTMENT HEAD 
TOUR."  
[]Have you screened for Department Head?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Yes  
• No (Not Yet Eligible)  
• No (1 Time Failure to Select)  
• No (2 Time Failure to Select)  
[]In what community will/did you serve your "Department Head Tour?"  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was 'Yes' at 
question '30 [Q29]' (Have you screened for Department Head?). 
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Not Applicable  
• HM  
• HSC/HS  
• HSM/HSL  
• HT  
• VAQ  
• VAW  
• VFA  
• VP  
• VQ(P)  
• VQ(T)  
• VRC  
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• VT  
• Other  
[]Where is/was your assigned duty station?  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was NOT 'Not 
Applicable' at question '31 [Q30]' (In what community will/did you serve your 
"Department Head Tour?”). 
Please choose only one of the following: 
• CONUS Central  
• CONUS East Coast  
• CONUS West Coast  
• OCONUS  
• Other  
[]What was your ranking on your final competitive FITREP during your 
"Department Head Tour?"  
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met: Answer was NOT 'Not 
Applicable' at question '31 [Q30]' (In what community will/did you serve your 
"Department Head Tour?"). 
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Not Applicable  
• #1 EP  
• #2 or greater EP/unnumbered EP  
• #1 MP  
• #2 or greater MP/unnumbered MP  
A "competitive" FITREP is any FITREP with a summary group of more than "1" 
(Typically a Periodic or Detachment of Reporting Senior report and not a Detachment of 
Individual report).  
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
The following questions refer to your basic demographic information:  
[]Commissioning Source:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
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• U.S. Naval Academy  
• ROTC  
• OCS  
• STA-21  
• ECP  
• Other  
[]Rank:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• O-2  
• O-2E  
• O-3  
• O-3E  
• O-4  
• O-5  
[]Warfare Designator:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Pilot  
• NFO  
[]Fiscal Year Commissioned:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• 1992 or prior  
• 1993  
• 1994  
• 1995  
• 1996  
• 1997  
• 1998  
• 1999  
• 2000  
• 2001  
• 2002  
• 2003  
• 2004  
• 2005  
• 2006  
• 2007  
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• 2008  
• 2009  
• 2010  
• 2011  
• 2012 or later  
Note: A Fiscal Year runs from 01 October the previous calendar year to 30 September in 
the same calendar year (e.g., Fiscal Year 2000 was from 01 October 1999 to 30 
September 2000).  
[]Fiscal Year Designated (i.e., "Winged"):  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• 1994 or prior  
• 1995  
• 1996  
• 1997  
• 1998  
• 1999  
• 2000  
• 2001  
• 2002  
• 2003  
• 2004  
• 2005  
• 2006  
• 2007  
• 2008  
• 2009  
• 2010  
• 2011  
• 2012 or later  
Note: A Fiscal Year runs from 01 October the previous calendar year to 30 September in 
the same calendar year (e.g., Fiscal Year 2000 was from 01 October 1999 to 30 
September 2000).  
[]What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Bachelor's degree  
• Some Postgraduate Education  
• Master's degree 
 150 
• Doctorate  
• Other  
[]Please select any additional qualifications / experience you have earned 
(Select all that apply):  
Please choose all that apply: 
• CDO  
• JPME  
• OOD  
• SWO Pin  
• TAO  
• SFTI/WTI  
• Flag Aide  
• GSA/IA  
• Strike Lead  
• Other:  
[]Gender  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Female  
• Male  
[]Race  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• White  
• Black/African American  
• Hispanic  
• Asian/Pacific Islander  
• Native American/Alaskan Native  
• Other  
[]Marital Status  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• Single/Never Married  
• Married/Civil Union  
• Divorced/Separated  
• Widowed  
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CONCLUSION 
[]What do YOU think would be the best way to administer the Aviation 
Career Continuation Pay bonus?  
Please write your answer here: 
  
[]Please add any additional comments you wish to share with the 
researchers:  
Please write your answer here: 
  
Thank you for your participation in this survey. 
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APPENDIX E.  RESULTS OF PREFERENCES AMONG NAVAL 
AVIATORS 
Aviators were asked to rate how the factors below affect/affected their decision to 
stay on Active Duty and serve a Department Head Tour: 
 


















































Figure 21.  Career Opportunities 
 
 
















































Figure 23.  Patriotism / Camaraderie 
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